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rescinding or withdrawing several high profile workplace and environmental rules and announcing the practical death of the Kyoto
Treaty on global warming. These actions were justified on the ground
that the measures' benefits were far outweighed by their economic
costs.' Those executive branch decisions followed quickly on the
heels of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision that Congress does not impermissibly delegate its legislative authority when it
bars federal agencies from considering the cost of regulations.
These recent events have elevated the public prominence of the
debate over regulatory cost-benefit analysis. That debate, however,
has been with us since the day the first wave of late twentieth-century
federal health and environmental statutes were passed. Executive orders requiring agency cost-benefit analysis have been a significant feature of the regulatory landscape since the Nixon administration.! Requiring regulations to undergo rigorous cost-benefit analysis was one
of the foundations of the Contract with America on which House Re-

See, e.g.,John Fialka, Arsenic and Wild Space: Green Activists from Across the Spectrum
Unite Against Bush, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2001, at A20 ("When the Bush administration
said it had no more interest in the Kyoto Protocol to curb climate change, most environmental groups went on the attack."); Bruce Handy & Glynis Sweeny, Safety Isfor Sissies, TIME, Apr. 16, 2001, at 88 ("Critics say the Bush Administration has been recklessly
reversing Clinton-era policies ....); Anitha Reddy, New Rule on Injury Reporting Rejected: Repetitive Motion Ills Deemed Vague, WASH. POST, June 30, 2001, at El ("The federal government.., rejected a proposal to require employers to separately report [certain types of workplace injuries,] a decision critics say will make it harder to identify
health problems caused by repetitive motion."); Cindy Skrzycki, Oppostion Braces for
Rule Rollback, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2001, at El ("Members of public-interest groups,
who played key roles during the Clinton administration in [implementing various
rules,] now find themselves scrambling to protect their handiwork.").
2 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,
486 (2001).
3 For overviews of the history of executive orders
that have attempted to require
agencies to consider regulatory compliance costs, see EDWARD PAUL FUCHS,
PRESIDENTS, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION (1988); THOMAS 0. McGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY.

THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL

BUREAUCRACY 17-25 (1991); Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialManagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 546-51 (1989), which catalogues presidential efforts to
provide oversight to regulatory programs; Joseph Cooper & William F. West, Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency
Rules, 50J. POL. 864, 880 (1988), which theorizes that review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is an assertion of the power of the presidency in the rapidly
developing administrative state and that this review has had a significant coercive effect
on agency activities; and Project: The Impact of Cost-Benefit Analysis on Federal Administrative Law, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 545, 553-63 (1990), which chronicles the use of cost-benefit
analysis in public decision making from the mid-nineteenth century to the present.
On environmental regulation in particular, see MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:

TO CLINTON (expanded ed. 1994).

ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON
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publicans successfully campaigned during the 1994 midterm elections. The 104th Congress failed in its attempt to enact a statutory
"supermandate" 4 requiring that all new federal regulations be justified
by cost-benefit analysis. 5 It did succeed, however, in requiring all federal agencies to disclose rulemakings to Congress and include a costbenefit analysis with any "major" rulemaking (one determined by the
Office of Management and Budget to involve at least $100 million in
economic costs).6 Although congressional attempts to amend specific
statutes to require that regulatory standards be cost-benefit justified
have failed Congress has recently funded a three-year pilot project in
which the General Accounting Office will conduct an independent
cost-benefit analysis of all "economically significant" regulations
(those with an economic impact of $100 million or more).
With policymakers focusing so much attention on regulatory costbenefit analysis, it is not surprising that legal commentators have recently undertaken important reevaluations of whether and how costbenefit analysis should be done. Before his appointment to the
United States Supreme Court, Justice Breyer published an influential
book skewering the apparent irrationality of the Environmental Protection Agency's risk regulations. 8 According to Justice Breyer's fig-

4 The term is Cass Sunstein's. Cass R. Sunstein, Congress,
ConstitutionalMoments,
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 270 (1996).
5 The cost-benefit supermandate was included in the Comprehensive Regulatory
Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1995). For an explanation of
why this bill failed to pass, see Marc Landy & Kyle D. Dell, The Failureof Risk Reform Legislation in the 104th Congress, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y F. 113, 120-21 (1998). The
104th Congress did, however, pass the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-4 §§ 202(a), 205(a), 109 Stat. 48, 64-66 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§602, 632,
653, 658, 658a-658g, 1501-1571 (Supp. 11995)), which requires quantitative assessment
of benefits and cost-benefit balancing for all proposed and final rules with an expected
cost above $100 million and also mandates that agencies choose the least cost regulatory alternative (what is known as "cost effective" regulation).
6 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (2000), requires regulatory agencies to do cost-benefit analysis of "major" rules, and the Congressional Review Act of 1996, included as Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 857, 868-74
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000)), requires that all agencies report on all regulations to each house of Congress and to the Comptroller General and delays finalization of "major" regulations until at least sixty days after the required report is submitted to Congress.
7 The OSHA Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 1192, 106th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1999), Regulatory Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 3311, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), and Air Quality Standard Improvement Act of 2000, S. 2362, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000) would all
have required that regulatory standards be justified by a substantive cost-benefit test.
8 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).
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ures, 9 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) often promulgated
regulations whose benefits were miniscule in comparison to the costs
they imposed on the affected industry, and failed to regulate many
risks that scientists felt were serious and should be regulated. To solve
the problem, Breyer proposed a super-agency composed of experts
who would evaluate the actual costs and benefits of risk regulation,
and then prioritize regulations according to their net social benefits.
Similarly convinced that "under any measure, there can be no doubt
that resources for risk reduction are badly allocated,"' ° Professor Sunstein has advocated the enactment of a federal statute requiring that
all federal agencies must at least consider and balance regulatory costs
against regulatory benefits." More recently, Sunstein has argued that
by frequently either requiring cost-benefit analysis in statutes or interpreting existing statutes to at least allow agencies to consider compliance costs in standard-setting, the federal courts and Congress may
have made such a statutory supermandate unnecessary: the "costbenefit" state may already be here. 2 Indeed, although some analysts
have attempted to provide a rigorous normative justification for regulatory cost-benefit analysis, much of the recent literature on federal
regulation takes regulatory cost-benefit analysis as a given, and compares how agencies actually do cost-benefit analysis with various conceptions of how they should do so. '4

9 Figures cogently critiqued by Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
10 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 257.

I Id. at 308-09. The sort of informal balancing advocated by Sunstein is somewhat
similar to the modified, "environmentalist baseline" version of cost-benefit analysis put
forth in DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 114-40 (1999). Farber's approach, which recommends that "to the
extent feasible without incurring costs grossly disproportionate to any benefit, the government should eliminate significant environmental risks," id. at 131, basically restates
what has in fact become the default regime under the default principles explicated by
Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,99 MICH. L. REV. 1651
(2001) (outlining the basic features of the default principles).
12 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC 10-14 (Univ.
of Chi. John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 135, 2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ARITHMETIC
OF ARSENIC]; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1656-63. For an exhaustive critique of the
"cost-benefit state" see Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 7
(1998).
"3 Most notably, perhaps, Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner
eds., 2001) (providing a multidisciplinary evaluation of cost-benefit methodology).
4 A primary issue in this debate is whether an agency such as EPA should discount
back to present value the benefits of future lives saved (or lengthened) by regulation.
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Other commentators criticize the failure of particular statutes to
explicitly require cost-benefit analysis. Because nationally uniform
federal pollution standards fail to take account of the actual costs and
benefits of pollution control in particular localities, they have long
been criticized as inefficient.' 5 As a number of scholars have recently
pointed out, however, supposedly uniform national environmental
standards are in practice subject to tremendous regional variation that
reflect primarily the varying cost of compliance.16 Some argue that
since the costs of environmental regulations inevitably enter the regulatory process sub rosa-as regulatory cost-bearers and beneficiaries
lobby the President, Congress and the agency, and engage in protracted litigation if a rule is actually finalized-the consideration of
costs should become an explicit part of the agency's statutory mandate. 7
Despite this general enthusiasm for regulatory cost-benefit analysis, little work has yet been done analyzing how the actual behavior of
regulatory agencies is likely to be affected by alternative institutional
requirements for cost-benefit analysis. Many cost-benefit advocates
seem to think that it is obvious that if statutes were amended to require regulatory agencies to analyze the costs and benefits of their
proposed rules, then those agencies would promulgate fewer regulations. These advocates further assume that these few regulations

Compare Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,107 YALE L.J. 1981, 204356 (1998) (arguing that discounting human lives is justifiable only if human life is
measured in dollars), with FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 11, at 133-62, and
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941,996-1007 (1999) (arguing that discounting in the
context of harms to future generations is unjustified).
15 E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) ("Uniform ...requirements waste many billions of
dollars annually by ignoring variations among plants and industries in the cost of reducting pollution and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects.").
16 E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance
and Creative Compliance in EnvironmentalLaw, 23 HARv. ENVrL. L.J. 297, 316-17 (1999) (theorizing that
a source with high compliance costs has a greater incentive to resist government activity, that this leads to regulatory "slippage," and that this slippage has led to "incomplete and underenforced" regulation of "supposedly uniform standards").
17 SeeJames E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards
in a Federal
System-And Why It Matters,54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1231-33 (1995) (noting that Congress
and the EPA make provisions for waivers and delayed timetables because they know
that it is more difficult to meet standards in some areas than in others); Barton H.
Thompson,Jr., People or PrairieChickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1156 (1999) ("The current submerged consideration of costs and
benefits [under the federal Endangered Species Act] ...is not a substitute for a direct,
open balancing [of costs and benefits.]").
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would be "better," because agencies would have taken a better and
more detailed account of the real economic costs of regulatory compliance.' 8 But there has been neither empirical nor theoretical investigation of these conjectures.
This gap in the literature is especially striking given the fact that
regulatory cost-benefit analysis is in fact already required by both a series of executive orders' 9 and recent federal statutes. ° Under those
orders, through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

18 This position is taken by Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious
Circle, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 257 (2001).
11 As part of a general strategy to reassert executive branch control over policy
implementation, in 1981 President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which required all regulatory agencies to submit "regulatory impact statements" to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982). These statements
were required to include cost-benefit analysis justifying the regulation. J. Clarence Davies, Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 143, 149 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft
eds., 1991). Four years later, executive branch control was further enhanced by Executive Order 12,498, which required agencies to give OIRA one year's notice of anticipated rulemaking. Norman J. Vig, PresidentialLeadership and the Environment: From
Reagan to Clinton, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 98, 103 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 4th ed. 2000). Using Executive Order 12,291 as a legal basis, in its final year and a half, the (first) Bush Administration shifted substantial regulatory review authority to the White House Council on
Competitiveness, a group chaired by the Vice President and including the secretaries
of treasury and commerce and the attorney general. The so-called "Quayle Council"
provided a forum for industry complaints about regulatory compliance costs and conducted its own cost-benefit analysis of regulations. Norman J. Vig, PresidentialLeadership and the Environment: From Reagan and Bush to Clinton, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 71, 85 (NormanJ. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d
ed. 1994). An important change was made by President Clinton's Executive Order
12,866 of 1993. This Order replaced Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 and, while it
continued to require agencies to assess the costs and benefits of their regulations, it
significantly changed policy by stressing that "[c]osts and benefits shall be understood
to include both quantifiable measures .... and qualitative measures of costs and benefits... [and] in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should
select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and
equity... )." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994). As argued by Susan E.
Dudley & Angela Antonelli, Congress and the Clinton OMB: UnwillingPartnersin Regulatory Oversight?,REGULATION, Fall 1997, at 17, by placing "environmental, public health
and safety... distributive impacts; and equity" on a par with economic costs and benefits, Clinton's order in fact represented a complete reversal of the Reagan-Bush strategy of White House regulatory review and returned policymaking authority to regulatory agencies.
20 See supra notes 5-7 (describing Congress's attempts at requiring usage of costbenefit analysis).
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has come to specialize in regulatory cost-benefit analysis. But in the
eyes of OMB's critics, it does not conduct an open and objective costbenefit analysis, but rather provides a closed, nonpublic forum for
regulated firms to present only their side-the cost side-of the
story.2' There have
been22 all sorts of proposals to reform the OMB
•
regulatory review process. Yet as with proposals to make cost-benefit
analysis a statutory requirement, there has been little if any empirical
or theoretical analysis of how OMB review influences the behavior of
regulatory agencies. 3

21

The debate over how OMB conducts regulatory review is as old as regulatory

review. Compare, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65
,TEX. L. REv. 1243, 1332 (1987) (recommending that the OMB "coordinate its regulatory analysis review function with its paperwork function, so that it approves information gathering activities designed to yield information that it is likely to require later in
the reviewing process"), and Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1986) (arguing
that the "unwarranted" dominance of the OMB in the regulatory rulemaking process
requires the restriction and ultimate elimination of the OMB's involvement in the process), with Christopher D. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (arguing in favor of regulatory review by the
Executive Office of the President). For more recent work, see Robert V. Percival,
Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127, 161-68, which argues that OMB review
has made it more difficult for the EPA to issue regulations and has "made the regulations that the agency has been able to pass less stringent"; and THOMAS 0. McGARrTY,
RETHINKING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY (1991).
22 E.g., E. Donald Elliot, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why
Regulatory Review Under Executive
Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 167, 181-84 (outlining what President Clinton should to improve the OMB's role in the regulatory review process); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7 (1995) (discussing the
substantive and procedural changes to the regulatory process made by Executive Order 12,866, which include reducing the number of rules that the OMB reviews by half).
23 Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001), attempts to apply the analytical
framework developed by Thomas Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking
and Standing Committees: An InformationalRationalefor Restrictive Amendment Procedures,3
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987), and extended by David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A
Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
227 (1995), to think about cost-benefit analysis as a way for the Executive (or Congress) to get the information that the agency has by virtue of its expertise. Within this
general framework-which rigorously establishes what has become known as the informational rationale for political delegation-a principal (Congress as a whole, or the
President) delegates authority to an agent (a congressional committee, or a regulatory
agency), which acquires specialized information about the relationship between announced policies and actual policy outcomes. The agent uses its specialized knowledge and expertise (asymmetric information) to get policy outcomes that it likes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the agent moves outcomes toward its preferred point
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In this Article, I address these gaps in the literature by using the
tools of game theory to model how regulatory decision making is
likely to vary both with statutory type-whether the statute explicitly
requires cost-benefit analysis-and with the substantive expertise and
procedural openness of OMB review. I model notice-and-comment
rulemaking as a sequential game. This game begins with (1) the
agency's decision whether to propose a rule, proceeds through (2) a
lobbying stage in which both the agency and regulatory targets lobby
the executive and legislative branches, and ends with (3) a decision by
the regulatory target on whether or not to seek judicial review of the
regulation. In this game, regulatory targets possess private information as to the cost of compliance and have two opportunities to block
regulation. Their first chance is provided by a lobbying contest that is
initiated by (and sometimes even before) a regulation is proposed.
Here, they attempt to increase the political costs to the agency from
going forward with the regulation as proposed. If they fail to kill the
regulation, then targets have an opportunity to seek judicial review of
the regulation. Although simplified, this sequential game captures
many of the key strategic features of the regulation game, and generates a number of nonintuitive insights into agency rulemaking incentives under alternative institutional environments.
The model is first employed to analyze agency rulemaking incentives under a benefits statute versus a cost-benefit statute.24 It is important
to begin with a clear idea of what I mean by these terms. Under a
and away from those preferred by the principal, the principal nonetheless prefers to
delegate to the agent because the agent uses its expertise to reduce uncertainty over
actual outcomes. Since in this model both the principal and the agent are risk averse,
they both gain from the reduction in uncertainty. The general issue that Posner identifies-whether cost-benefit analysis might prevent the agency from using its expertise to
bias policy toward outcomes that it favors-is interesting and important, but his application of the informational model of delegation is highly problematic. Most seriously,
in concluding that the agency is better off when a cost-benefit requirement forces it to
reveal its information to the President or Congress than when it can keep such information to itself, Posner states a conclusion that is simply inconsistent with the model
he applies: in that model (see Proposition 1 and its explanation, Epstein &
O'Halloran, supra, at 235-36), the agency is always better off when it can use its asymmetric information to evade control by the President (or Congress) than when the
President or Congress has complete information; and the more extreme the agency,
the more advantage it takes of its superior information (if the agency's preferences are
too extreme, the rationale for delegation fails).
24 By restricting the formal analysis to the choice between
a benefits and (alternative versions of) a cost-benefit statute, I do not mean to suggest that these are the only
types of regulatory statutes. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1701-03, is clearly correct, for
instance, in identifying feasibility statutes (those that tell the regulator to regulate to
the extent "feasible") as another important general statutory type.
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benefits statute, the agency is commanded to focus only on gross, not
net regulatory benefits. Under section 101(a) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, for instance, Congress
instructed the EPA to eliminate totally the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters of the United States by 1985, and "wherever attainable" to bring all such waters up to fishable/swimmable quality by
1983. 2 Likewise, under section 109 of the Clean Air Act (as amended
in 1990), the EPA is instructed to set primary national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQs) at that level "which ... allowing an ade26
quate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health."
Neither of these statutory provisions makes any mention of the cost of
achieving their ambitious goals. They are, in my terminology, benefits
statutes.
There are two species of cost-benefit statutes. Under what I shall
call a substantive cost-benefit statute, the agency is explicitly instructed
to balance the costs and benefits of alternative standards for reducing
environmental or health risks, and to set the standard at a "reasonable" level. One illustration of a substantive cost-benefit statute is provided by the Flood Control Act of 1936. The Act instructs the Army
Corps of Engineers to "improve or participate in the improvement of
navigable waters.., for flood-control purposes if the benefits to
costs." 27
whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated
Another substantive cost-benefit statute is the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). This statute mentions the term "unreasonable risk"
thirty-five times, and authorizes the EPA to regulate chemical substances if it finds that there is a "reasonable basis to conclude" that the
manufacture, use, processing, or distribution of such substance "presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. " 29 The Act explicitly requires that EPA investigate not only
25

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,

§ 101(a)(1)-(2), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(2)

(1994)).
26

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(b) (1), 84 Stat. 1676,

1680 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (1994)).
27 Flood Control Act of 1936 § 1, 33 U.S.C. §701a (1994). It is worth noting that
the Supreme Court has often taken this provision as exemplifying an explicit statutory
cost-benefit mandate. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
510 (1981) ("When Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of its statute. One early example is
the Flood Control Act of 1936 .... ).
28 William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owls and the Crows: The Role of Deception
in the Evolution of the EnvironmentalStatutes, 4J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 379 (1989).
Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
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the health and environmental risks of the substance, but also the
benefits flowing from its use, "the availability of substitutes for it, and
'the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences' of regulation."3 ° More generally, TSCA declares that its policy is "not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological
innovation."3 '
In contrast with substantive cost-benefit statutes, procedural costbenefit statutes say nothing about how the agency strikes the costbenefit balance; they merely require the agency to do the balancing.
Paradigmatic of such a statute is the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA). Section 102(c) of NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for any "major" federal action with a "significant" environmental impact.32 To
survive judicial review under NEPA, agencies must be able to show
that they have prepared an EIS if one was required and used that
statement in a good faith attempt to balance the environmental costs
33
of a federal program against the program's benefits.
Benefits statutes differ in important ways from both types of costbenefit statutes. Under a benefits statute, the agency has no statutory
obligation to consider regulatory costs, and may even be expressly
forbidden from taking such costs into account in setting the regulatory standard.3 Under a cost-benefit statute, by contrast, the agency
30 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:

LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 456 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting Toxic Substances Control Act, § 6(c) (1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(c)(1) (1994).
Toxic Substances Control Act § 2(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (b) (3) (1994).
32 NEPA, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(c),
83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994)). That section requires all federal agencies to
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement... on ...(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action."

Id.

33 As the court held in Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic

Energy Commission:
reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on the merits,
[under NEPA] unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully
and in good faith-it is the responsibility of courts to reverse.
449 F.2d 1109,1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
34 The extent to which an agency may consider costs
in setting standards under a
benefits statute varies with the language of the particular statutory provision at issue.
Compare, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reaffirming that under the line of decisions beginning with Lead Industries Ass'ns v. EPA,
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has a statutory obligation to balance both costs and benefits, and thus
is obliged to specifically consider costs.
Just as courts generally have assumed that benefits statutes not
only do not mandate but in fact may preclude the agency from considering costs, so too have they generally understood cost-benefit statutes as requiring explicit and detailed evaluation by the agency of
both costs and benefits. 3 5 What this means is that if a firm or individual wants to argue that a regulation under a cost-benefit statute is too
costly, then it can make the argument to the court after the regulation
is finalized. Under a benefits statute, by contrast, arguments attacking
a regulation as too costly can only be made to the agency, the legislature or the Executive. The cost-benefit statute provides parties who
bear regulatory costs an additional forum in which to try to block such
a regulation on the ground that costs were not adequately considered
by the agency.
The sequential game model of regulation generates a number of
nonintuitive insights into the regulatory process. First, even under a
benefits statute-where the agency has no statutory obligation to balance compliance costs with social benefits-the agency generally will
internalize some of the compliance costs its regulation will impose.
The reason is that the higher is the regulatory target's perceived cost
of compliance, the greater is its equilibrium expenditure on lobbyists
and lawyers at both the lobbying and judicial review stages. And the
greater the target's effort and expenditure in resisting regulation, the
lower the agency's expected net return from promulgating the regulation. As a consequence, among regulatory alternatives yielding an
equal benefit as perceived by the regulator, the regulatory game itself
provides an incentive for the regulator to choose the cost-minimizing
alternative.

647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the EPA may not consider costs in promulgating air
quality standards under section 109(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act), with Michigan v. EPA,
213 F.3d 663, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that EPA may consider costs in determining whether a state "contributes significantly" to interstate air pollution under section 10(a) (2) (D) of the Clean Air Act). A fair reading of the cases supports the argument made by Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1676-79, that the courts have adopted a
default presumption that even under a benefits statute, an agency may consider costs
unless statutory language clearly precludes such consideration.
35 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228
(1980) (holding that section 102(c) of NEPA requires agencies to balance environmental costs against project benefits, but does not set a substantive standard for such
balancing); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting TSCA to require the EPA to show that its regulation is the least burdensome available to it).

1354

UNIVERSIT OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150:1343

Another result from the model is that lobbying itself may generate
socially valuable information. If the judicial review process is procedurally complex and costly, then a regulatory target with a high cost of
compliance may be willing to spend so much on judicial review that
the regulator would not pursue the regulation if it knew that the firm
had high compliance cost. In this circumstance, the high cost of
compliance type of regulatory target will make a separating expenditure of effort on lobbying, choosing such a high level that the regulator learns from the target's lobbying effort that the target has high
compliance cost and is not worth regulating.
Whenever there is a chance that the agency will decide not to proceed with the regulation as a consequence of the firm's lobbying effort (whether due to the information that effort conveys or the political cost it imposes on the agency), the agency has an incentive to
acquire information as to the firm's compliance cost at the time it initiates a rulemaking. In this way, even under a benefits statute, a costly
regulatory process creates an incentive for the agency to gain information about, and weigh carefully, the target's cost of complying with the
contemplated regulation.
This in no way implies that benefits statutes incentivize the agency
to perform a complete, detailed, and thoughtful balance of costs and
benefits. For this reason, it may seem desirable to write the costbenefit balancing requirement into the statute.
Incentives under a cost-benefit statute are not necessarily what
one might expect. When the court is a perfect ex post verifier of regulatory costs and benefits, a substantive cost-benefit statute guarantees
that the agency will never end up regulating inefficiently. But it also
threatens a low-compliance-cost target (regulation of which is efficient) with certain defeat at the judicial review stage if a regulation is
promulgated. For this reason, the perfect substantive cost-benefit
statute maximizes a low-compliance-cost target's incentive for very
high, type-concealing lobbying expenditures. The model predicts that
even within a given industry, not all regulatory targets would prefer to
move to a substantive cost-benefit statute. More generally, one would
expect to see lobbying increase rather than decrease if Congress does
change the law from a benefits to a cost-benefit standard. Thus, the
formal model shows that contrary to the intuition of many commentators, explicit statutory cost-benefit requirements may enhance rather
than reduce the incentive to politicize regulatory costs.
Unguided intuition suggests that procedural cost-benefit statutes
such as NEPA will have only a weak effect on agency incentives. After
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all, such statutes merely impose a legal requirement that the agency
acquire and weigh information about regulatory costs. My sequential
regulatory game model shows that this intuition may be quite wrong,
and that such a procedural requirement may be remarkably effective
in altering agency behavior. A procedural cost-benefit statute guarantees an agency that it will succeed at the judicial review stage if it does
the required ex ante balancing. Relative to other regimes, such a
statute maximizes the agency's final stage benefit from doing such ex
ante balancing. Because the agency will drop the regulation when it
learns early on that the target has high compliance cost, the procedural cost-benefit statute is likely to eliminate even more regulation
than does a substantive cost-benefit statute.
After explaining these results, and exploring potential extensions
of the model to add realism, I develop some of the many positive implications of the more formal analysis. The relative success of NEPA
in altering the type and reducing the volume of projects done by federal project agencies such as the Corps of Engineers confirms the
model's prediction about the effect of procedural cost-benefit statutes.
Similarly, the history of continued lobbying by the pesticide manufacturing and agricultural industries under the Federal Insecticide, Fun36
gicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) -a substantive cost-benefit statute-supports the model's analysis of incentives under such a statute.
Additionally, the model argues that the courts have read benefits
statutes the way Congress intended by interpreting such statutes to allow, but not require, regulatory agencies to consider compliance costs.
Even though regulatory targets would always prefer a cost-benefit statute, Congress prefers benefits statutes. The reason is that such statutes preserve congressional control over future, oftentimes unforeseen extensions of regulatory authority, and allow Congress maximum
flexibility to respond to the political costs of regulation., More concretely, as a body composed of members representing geographic
places, members of Congress generally want the flexibility to intervene
on behalf of industries and other regulatory targets that are locally
important (whether at the state or district level). Benefits statutes
maximize congressional discretion to play such an interventionist,
regulation-curbing role.
The Article concludes with a cautionary note on the potential for
cost-benefit analysis to reform environmental regulation. NEPA was

36 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (2000).

89-120 and accompanying text.

See the discussion of FIFRA, infra text and notes
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effective precisely because it overcame the strong strategic incentives
of federal project agencies (e.g., the Bureau of Reclamation) to provide concentrated benefits while concealing the large but diffuse environmental costs of their projects. Unlike federal development projects, federal environmental regulation imposes predominantly private
costs about which targets are systematically better informed than are
regulators. But environmental regulators have a choice among alternative regulatory instruments. Just as environmental regulators have
an incentive to overstate the benefits of environmental regulation, so
too do they have an incentive to prefer regulatory instruments-most
importantly, technology-based standards-that reduce the inherent
advantage regulatory targets have with respect to information about
costs. Revising environmental statutes to require the EPA to consider
regulatory costs is not the solution to the problem of inefficient technology-based standards. The need to survive judicial review of its costbenefit calculation will merely reinforce the agency's incentive to stick
with known pollution-abatement technologies rather than experimenting with novel and potentially more effective, but also more uncertain and potentially more costly approaches. To create the incentives necessary for further environmental improvement requires a
much more radical devolution to states, localities, and private selfregulatory groups.
I.

THE STRATEGIES OF ADVERSARIAL REGULATION UNDER
ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY SCHEMES

This Part develops a simple model of the regulation process as a
sequential game.37 I use the model to study a regulatory agency's incentive to consider both the costs and benefits of a potential regulation. My primary aim is to show that an agency's incentive to weigh
regulatory compliance costs is likely to differ under a benefits versus a
cost-benefit statute. A crucial feature of the model is that it allows for
regulatory cost-bearers to make their case both in lobbying (before a
regulation is promulgated) as well as in mounting a legal challenge
after a regulation has been promulgated. 38 For this reason, the model
37 Inasmuch as the authors consider a regulation
game where the regulatory target
is asymmetrically well informed, Tracy Lewis & Michel Poitevin, Disclosureof Information
in Regulatory Proceedings,13J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997), bears some similarity to the
model developed below. Their focus, however, is on how the incentive of a regulatory
target to disclose information (more precisely, an evidentiary signal) to the regulator
varies with the cost of disclosure, and they do not model lobbying.
38 My approach owes much to the pathbreaking general insights
of Matthew D.
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shows a great deal about how lobbying and litigation incentives interact in the regulatory process. Beyond this particular issue, the analysis
generates very concrete predictions about agency behavior in rule1!
making that are strongly borne out by actual agency practice.
A.

The Regulation Game

Consider a representative federal democracy with an executive,
legislature, and executive agency. I abstract from the effect of national political party affiliation, an important topic that I treat separately below. I shall refer to legislative districts (for my purposes, the
bicameral nature of the United States Congress is not central). I take
it as given that regulation has both costs and benefits. Not all of the
costs of regulation are borne by regulatory targets. If, for instance,
regulation is so costly that it causes some (typically small) firms to
close and lay off workers, then not only do firm owners suffer lost
profits, but workers suffer lost wages, while the lost income and property tax revenues previously generated by the firm may lead to a ieduction in various public services that have even wider effects on the
community within which the firm was located. The distinction between the direct private cost of regulation and other social colts of
regulation will figure later in my analysis. In modeling the regulation
game, however, I simplify initially by assuming that all of the costs of
regulation are private and borne by regulated firms and their workers.
I shall refer to those persons who bear the costs of regulation as
regulatory targets or cost-bearers, while those who get the benefits will
be referred to as regulatory beneficiaries. Reflecting the most recent
political science evidence, I assume that regulation results from what

McCubbins et al., AdministrativeProcedures as Instruments of PoliticalControl, 3J.L. ECdN.
& ORG. 243 (1987), who first set out the basic notion that judicial review ought to be
looked at, along with lobbying, as sequential stages of the regulatory process. My
model formalizes many of the insights contained there, id. at 251-53, although on
some points-such as my assumption that it is costless for the Executive and Congress
" I
to impose political sanctions-I differ from their analysis.
lobbyand
how
litigation
The only other paper of which I am aware that looks at
ing incentives interact isJohn M. de Figueiredo & RuiJ.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation (June 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Where our models
overlap, we obtain similar results: for instance, I explain how the incentive to lobby
vanishes for a high-compliance-cost firm under a perfect cost-benefit regime, infra Part
I.C.1. But the overlap is small: their paper does not address the problem of asymmetric. firm information regarding compliance cost, which is central to my analysis; and
because I take judges as random but faithful implementers of whatever legislative regime Congress has established, I do not explore the separate effect ofjudicial ideology.
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is fundamentally an adversarial process in which the agency must
choose between pursuing a particular regulatory program or not. The
simple formal model of this Part thus does not allow the agency to
"fine-tune" the regulation in response to feedback it gets during the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The regulatory game I posit
has the following sequential structure depicted by Figure 1 below.
1. The agency acts first, deciding whether or not to develop regulations on a certain issue. I assume that the agency perceives some
benefit, B, from regulating. The agency simultaneously decides
whether to invest some amount, I, in acquiring information about
regulatory compliance cost.
2. If the agency decides to regulate, both before and after the
publication of a proposed regulation, regulatory targets, beneficiaries,
and the agency itself engage in a lobbying contest. At this stage, the
adversaries make expenditures to persuade Congress and the President that the proposed. regulation is or is not a good idea. Of course,
a fundamental goal of notice-and-comment rulemaking is to ensure
an opportunity for just such public participation before the agency.
There are no such procedural access guarantees when it comes to
lobbying the Executive and the legislature. Indeed, a traditional criticism of cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulations by the executive-level OMB is that access to OMB is limited and its reasoning
and methods shielded from public scrutiny. 9 In the model here, lobbying is important because if the agency continues and promulgates a
final regulation, its net regulatory benefit falls from B to B - D as a
consequence of lobbying activities, where D denotes the political costs
imposed through lobbying.
Political costs may be imposed either by Congress or by the President. Congressional opponents of a regulation can hold oversight
hearings, sapping time from other agency activities, and cut agency
appropriations. The President can recommend budgetary cuts and
exert direct control over agency staffing, hiring, and firing decisions.
For the time being, I assume that any political penalty imposed on the
agency is imposed only if the agency actually finalizes the regulation.
A final and important feature of lobbying in this model is that lobbying is costly. In general, one would expect that lobbying efforts by the
agency cut the political penalty, while those by the firm increase the

penalty. That is, if we let eadenote the agency's lobbying effort and e
See infra text Part llI.C (discussing OMB review and the roles of regulatory beneficiaries).
39
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denote the target firm's lobbying effort, then D = D(ea, e), with D, < 0
and D2 > 0.40
3. If the agency promulgates a final regulation, then the regulatory target chooses between complying with the regulation and challenging it in court. This is, of course, a simplification since the target
might simply refuse to comply and then defend against an enforcement action. For purposes of the present analysis, though, this is
functionally identical to challenging the regulation.
4. If the target seeks judicial review, then the parties simultaneously choose their litigation expenditures, L,, and Lf for the agency
and firm respectively.
These expenditures induce a probability
r, 0 < r < 1, that the regulation will be vacated, with r = r(L, Lf), r, < 0,
and r > 0. That is, the higher the litigation effort by the firm
(agency), the higher (lower) the probability ofjudicial reversal of the
agency's decision. 4' For simplicity, I assume that if the regulation is
vacated, then it is dead-the agency cannot take up and begin the
process again. The court's decision induces the payoffs indicated by
Figure 1, where c denotes the firm's cost of compliance. Compliance
cost has two possible realizations, c, <c.
The firm's objective is to choose a strategy that minimizes its total
expected cost. This expected cost is equal to the cost of lobbying and
litigating plus the firm's expected compliance cost. Symbolically, the
firm minimizes e + Lf+ (1 - r(Lo, Lf))c. As one can see immediately, the
only way that lobbying effort directly enters this function is as a cost.
This is because I have assumed that the agency does not modify the
regulation (lowering the firm's compliance cost) in response to the
firm's opposition to the regulation.
With so much in this model turning on the agency's net benefit, it
is important to clarify precisely what I am assuming about the behavior of a regulatory agency by unpacking what goes into its net benefit,
B - D. Economists working within the public finance tradition often
assume benevolent regulators-those who seek, for instance, to
maximize the net benefits of regulation to the society. 42 Economists
40 Lobbying by regulatory beneficiaries is also important, and I consider
this in
discussing the incentive effects of OMB review, infra Part III.C.
41 Although it surely is possible that certain kinds of litigation effort would be

counterproductive-such as filing motions that the judge believes to be frivolousgiven the structure of the game that I have set out, a rational actor will never take such
actions.
42 For a lucid exposition of this tradition as applied to the
design of environmental
regulatory policy, see Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, EnvironmentalEconomics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 682 (1992), describing how, if perfect

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

2002]

1361

(and political scientists) working within the contrasting public choice
tradition often assume that regulators are self-interested budget
maximizers, 43 or are subject to capture by regulated entities that prom-

ise future employment and other fairly direct

benefits.

44

Taken alone,

each of these models is incomplete. Together, they suggest a richer
model.

A fundamental insight of recent work in positive political theory is
that people who work for regulatory agencies have preferences about

the programs and policies that those agencies implement. 45 Experience shapes preferences, but, to a large extent, career regulators
bring their preferences with them to the agencies they join. For instance, in creating the United States Forest Service in the early part of
last century, Gifford Pinchot chose his new foresters from the ranks of
recent graduates of the newly formed Yale School of Forestry.4
Trained in the emerging discipline of "scientific forestry," Pinchot's
foresters had an almost religious commitment to certain forest management policies.4

'

Regardless of the official policy choices made by

knowledge is assumed, regulators can achieve the same benefits from taxing emissions
as from providing marketable emissions permits.
43 In this tradition, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971), is seminal.
44 On the contrast between the public finance and public
choice traditions, see
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
Two CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE (1999), which records the comments and
papers presented during a week-long lecture series debating the relative merits of the
public finance and public choice decision-making models, and AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE
MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS PERSPECTIVE 1-19
(Hans-Werner Sinn ed., 1996).
45 AsJames Q. Wilson
puts it:
Government agencies are not billiard balls driven hither and yon by the impact of forces and interests. When bureaucrats are free to choose a course of
action their choices will reflect the full array of incentives operating on them:
some will reflect the need to manage a workload; others will reflect the expectations of workplace peers and professional colleagues elsewhere; still others
may reflect their own convictions.
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 88 (1989); see also RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE 231 (2d ed. 1996) (describing how, in its early years, the EPA
attracted "zealots" committed to stringent environmental regulation); JOHN QUARLES,
CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY 58-76 (1976) (discussing lobbying by regulatory targets). For an illustration of
positive political theory put to work to explain the role and composition of
congressional committees, see KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION (1991).
46 NANCY LANGSTON, FOREST DREAMS, FOREST NIGHTMARES
109 (1995).
47 MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR FORESTS:
A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
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political appointees at the top of the agency hierarchy, economists at
the OMB are likely to have very different views about what constitutes
good policy than do conservation biologists employed by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service. There is thus a considerable amount
of self-selection that goes on when people choose which agency to
work for. While hardly monolithic, agencies may usefully be thought
of as having collective preferences.
In somewhat more technical economist lingo, regulatory agencies
get collective utility from policies and programs. To see their preferences realized in actual policies and programs, however, agencies
need time and money. Through the appropriations process, Congress
controls agency budgets. 8 In recent years, party leaders within the
House and Senate have exercised increasingly close control over the
makeup of appropriations committees. When agencies pursue policies or programs that are opposed by party leaders, they risk triggering congressional reaction, not only in the form of costly oversight
hearings, at which they will be grilled for hours by hostile committee
members, but also in the form of reduced future appropriations.
Hence when I refer to the net benefit to an agency from any particular proposed regulation (represented formally by B - D above) what I
mean more precisely is: the utility to the agency from the regulation
(the B term), minus the lost current and future utility from regulations that cannot be pursued because of costly oversight hearings
and/or budgetary reductions imposed by congressional opponents of
the regulation (the D term above).'

419 (1989).
48 This is of course a simplification, in that it is the executive
branch that has the
budgetary proposal power. Still, Congress has the final say. For a detailed account of
the structure and evolution of the federal budgetary process, see AARON WILDAVSKY,
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1998).
49 See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN:

PARTY

GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 163-87 (1993) (summarizing the importance of knowing

congressional leaders in order to receive an appointment to a committee).
0 Anecdotal support for the reasonableness of this specification is provided
by
comments made by former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. While SEC Chairman, Levitt had proposed toughening conflict-ofinterest regulations governing accounting firms. The accounting industry lobbied
fiercely and ultimately successfully against these regulations. Levitt, who served longer
than any other SEC chairman in the sixty-seven-year history of the agency, has vividly
described the cost of such lobbying: "I have never been subjected to a more intensive
and venal lobbying campaign. I spent nearly all of my time during those months responding to senatorial and congressional queries and visits. It was totally time consuming." Stephen Labaton, Auditing Firms Exercise Power in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2002, at Al. More systematic empirical support for the agency objective function I
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At any given time, a regulatory agency has fixed resources. Thus
what I formally assume about agency behavior in this Part of the Article is that an agency seeks to maximize the net present value of its utility from regulating (given by B - D), given its present budgetary/resource constraint. If the agency is regulating to the limit of its
present budgetary ability, then both litigating and lobbying
expenditures have a real resource cost to the agency (its foregone
benefit if the resources were expended on other regulations). Hence
the full statement of the agency's objective is to maximize
(1 - r(Lo, Lf))(B - D(e , e)) - e- L.
Although obviously reductionist, this approach does permit one to
analyze a number of very important aspects of the regulatory process,
including (in a way described in the Appendix) the degree of discretion given to the agency by Congress. In general, the more discretion
that an agency has been given by Congress-the less it is subject to direct control by Congress-the better able it is to pursue its preferred
policies and programs. Whether the statute requires the agency to do
cost-benefit analysis may have an important bearing on the degree of
agency discretion, and I turn to this issue-that figured so centrally in
the recent decision in Whitman v. American Trucking'-in the next Part
of the Article.
B. Incentivesfor Regulatory Cost ConsiderationUndera Benefits Statute
There is much to be learned in the meantime from the admittedly
simplified model of the regulatory process set out above. I begin with
the analysis of a benefits statute. In this model, the distinguishing feature of a benefits statute is that the agency has no statutory duty to
consider the firm's cost of compliance with the regulation. The functional significance of this is that at the judicial review stage of the
game, the probability that the regulation is vacated, rO, does not depend upon whether or not the agency incurred the cost Iof investigating the firm's compliance cost. The method of analysis, as in the
analysis of all sequential games, is to begin with the final, judicial re-

employ is provided by WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 54, 141-54 (1986) (testing and finding
support for the "external signals theory" that "a regulatory agency sets the stringency of
its standards to maximize the net support for a regulation that it receives or expects to
receive from interested outside parties, subject to a constraint on total agency re-

sources").
" 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

1364

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150:1343

view stage and to work backward. 2
1. Judicial Review and the Incentive for Cost-Effective Rulemaking
Under any reasonable assumption about the final, judicial review
stage, the firm's litigation effort increases in its perceived compliance
cost, c.5" Intuitively, the more it will cost the firm to comply with the
regulation, the more the firm is willing to spend in an attempt to get
the courts to invalidate the regulation. As in more general models of
litigation expenditure,5 4 the litigation efforts of the firm and the
agency are likely to be strategic complements. That means that, as the
level of one increases, the optimal level of the other also increases. If,
for instance, the firm simply files a complaint but does little else, then
the agency needs to do very little to win, but if the firm actually pursues the complaint, further efforts by the agency will be productive in
offsetting the firm's arguments. The marginal productivity of each
additional issue and argument raised may fall for each side. Yet provided that the argument is not completely irrelevant, one side's raising
the argument makes it strategically optimal for the other side to spend
something refuting it.
Under these very plausible assumptions, the judicial review process may itself create an incentive for the regulatory agency to choose
that regulation which is least costly among the set of regulations generating a particular level and type of benefit. A strategically rational
agency will realize that the higher is the firm's compliance cost, the
higher will be the amount that the firm will spend challenging the
regulation in court, and hence the higher will be the agency's optimal
expenditure in defending the regulation. The higher is the agency's
expenditure at the judicial review stage, the lower will be its net benefit from the regulation, since resources are diverted to legal defense
that might have been used to pursue other regulations and policies.
(That is,in the formal notation developed above, the higher L, is, the

52

In game theory, this solution technique is known as backward induction. For an

elucidation, see HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EvOLVING 16-17 (2000), which describes how backward induction starts at the end point to eliminate weakly dominated
strategies.
54 See Proposition 1 in the Appendix for a demonstration of this point.
See, e.g.,
Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987) (arguing "that the stakes of a lawsuit
and the marginal cost of legal services affect the equilibrium level of expenditure only
through the stakes-cost ratio [and that] the price elasticity of demand for legal services
is identical in magnitude to the elasticity of expenditure with respect to the stakes").
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lower B - D - e, - L, is). Hence, for any given level of benefit B, the
agency's incentive is to choose that regulation which minimizes the
firm's compliance cost. This is because, other things equal, the lower
the firm's compliance cost, the lower its optimal level of litigation effort will be, and the more effective the agency will likely be in getting
the regulation upheld on judicial review. 5
Thus judicial review-even review that ignores whether the agency
ever tried to ascertain firm compliance cost-is a mechanism that incentivizes the agency to internalize a regulatory target's compliance
cost. Because the firm's compliance cost is a primary determinant of
how much it will spend litigating to overturn a regulation, the regulator increases the probability that the regulation will survive judicial review by lowering regulatory compliance cost. Observe that in the economic literature on cost-benefit analysis, procedures by which the
least cost regulatory option is identified is known as "cost-effective
regulation. 5 6 The first result of the simple sequential model is that
judicial review creates an incentive for cost-effective regulation.
2.

Lobbying, Litigation, and the Agency's
Incentive to Learn About Cost

Regulatory compliance is a primary determinant of strategic behavior at the lobbying stage as well. As modeled here, firm lobbying
directly reduces the agency's payoff by making it clear to the agency
that if it continues and promulgates a final regulation, then there will
be a definite price to pay in the form of reduced future appropriations or increased levels of present and future oversight. By directly
lowering the agency's perceived net return from the regulation, lobbying by firms indirectly lowers the agency's optimal level of effort in the
judicial review stage. That is, just as compliance costs will affect how
much the finn will spend to resist a regulation in court, net benefits
from regulation will affect how much an agency will spend to defend
the regulation. There are thus two ways that firms benefit from lobby-

For this statement to be true, the equilibrium probability of reversal, r* must
not increase as the firm's litigation effort increases. This must be true, since only
agency litigation effort reduces r, and the agency is free to choose any effort level-to
make any argument or raise any issue-that it wishes regardless of the firm's effort
level.
56 For a discussion of the increasing emphasis on cost-effective
environmental
regulation during the latter part of the Clinton Administration, see SHEILA M.
55

CAVANAGH ET AL., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DURING THE CLINTON YEARS 7, 9

(AEI-BrookingsJoint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 01-09, 2001).
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ing. The first is by inflicting such a large political penalty, D, on the
agency if it finalizes the regulation that the agency will rationally decide to drop the regulation. Second, even if the agency goes ahead
with the regulation, lobbying has effectively weakened its value to the
agency, so the agency will spend less effort defending it before the
courts, and that increases the firm's equilibrium probability of getting
the regulation reversed.
Together with judicial review, the agency thus has a very strong
incentive to learn about the firm's compliance cost beforehand even
under a benefits statute. If the firm's cost of compliance is high
enough, then it may spend so much on lobbying that the agency ends
up dropping the regulation entirely, thus wasting agency resources
spent in studying, proposing, and lobbying for the regulation. Even if
lobbying doesn't kill the regulation, it may so weaken it (in terms of its
net benefit to the agency) that the agency's expected net benefitdiscounted by the probability of judicial reversal-is so low that the
cost of producing the regulation proves to have been uneconomical.
For these reasons, the agency will often have an incentive to incur the
cost Ito learn about the likely cost of compliance before it goes ahead
and proposes the regulation. Better to incur the cost I than to lose
potentially much more than that by pursuing a regulation to its
eventual graveyard. The model thus shows that even when there is no
statutory obligation to do so, the administrative rulemaking process
will itself often create strong incentives for the agency to do an
independent inquiry into the likely cost imposed by the regulation.
This is intuitive. Not so obvious to intuition, but revealed by the
model, are the strategic determinants of the agency's incentive to investigate regulatory compliance costs. The first and most general implication is that the costlier the lobbying and litigation processes, the
greater the agency's incentive to investigate and weigh the firm's
compliance cost. Moreover, the more risk averse the agency, the
greater the agency's incentive to learn about compliance cost. This is
because a risk averse agency does not like the risk of incurring lobbying and litigation costs without any benefit. "7
The model also shows, however, that there is no necessary correspondence between social costs and benefits and the costs and benefits that the regulatory process in effect forces the agency to internalize under a benefits statute. Suppose, for instance, that the Congress

57 Within this context, risk aversion arises when the agency's marginal benefit
from increasingly beneficial regulation is positive but declining.
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and President are strongly predisposed to, disfavor a particular sort of
regulation and to severely penalize the agency if it promulgates such a
regulation. If so, then the political cost of promulgation to the agency
may be regulation-deterring even though the firm's actual cost of
compliance is very low. The contrary case is also possible. If, for instance, the courts basically rubber stamp regulations and neither the
President nor Congress is much interested in a regulated area, then
even a firm whose compliance costs are far in excess of the regulator's
net benefit cannot effectively stave off regulation. Knowing this, the
agency would have little or no incentive to bother gaining information
about firm compliance cost at its own expense.
One might question whether these are testable predictions. It is,
after all, difficult to acquire data on how much investigation an agency
has done even prior to issuing a proposed regulation. Observed
agency behavior does, however, strongly support my model's plausibility. A large number of agencies, including notably both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Communications Commission, voluntarily issue "Notices of Proposed Rulemaking." Such
notices are a way for the agency to get some sense beforehand of the
regulated community's likely reaction to the potential (proposed)
rulemaking. More formally, early notification of the intent to regulate
is a way for the agency to take advantage of the strategic incentive that

regulated entities have to reveal regulatory compliance cost. It is a
way for regulators to cheaply get information about the likely opposition they will face if they decide to proceed with the regulation game
modeled above.

3. The Administrative Process as an Information Revelation Device
Cheap information
rulemaking notification
firms have an incentive
tion. One might think

is not necessarily reliable information. Prewill not work to elicit firm information unless
to truthfully convey compliance cost informathat this is unlikely because all firms will have

an incentive to say that they have high compliance cost to stave off

regulation. Under the earlier notation, one might well ask why the
low-compliance-cost type firm will not pretend to be a high-compliance-cost firm.
If the communication of compliance cost information is pure
cheap talk-with no direct cost to the firm-then this intuition will
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hold.5s If the regulator will go ahead and propose regulation only if it
learns that the firm has a low compliance cost (and hence will not
spend much to resist regulation), then the low-compliance-cost firm
will mimic whatever it is that the high-cost firm does to avoid being revealed as low cost. Regardless of what the regulator will do when it is
not informed as to firm type, the low-compliance-cost firm is best off
mimicking the high-cost firm's communication to the agency.
Even at the pre-regulation stage, however, communicating with a
regulatory agency is not necessarily cheap talk. To effectively reach
the agency, a regulated firm may need to pay large fees to lawyers and
lobbyists. With such costly communication, the pre-regulation phase
becomes in effect just an earlier stage of the general lobbying game
stage of the sequential regulation game model set out above. Early
notification of an intent to regulate may nonetheless be valuable to
the agency, if firms can somehow credibly communicate what they
know about the likely compliance cost. For the earlier the agency
finds out that a firm has a high-compliance-cost and will aggressively
resist regulation, the lower the agency's cost of changing course and
looking at other regulatory opportunities.
Hence the key behavioral question is whether costly lobbying by
regulatory targets can inform the agency about the firm's compliance
cost. It turns out that lobbying is sometimes informative and sometimes not. Consider first the case when lobbying is uninformative.
Retaining our simple situation in which there are two types of firmslow compliance cost and high compliance cost-suppose that the
agency will drop the regulation if it does not learn the firm's type. In
this situation, the low compliance cost firm has an incentive to mimic
whatever the high cost firm says in lobbying because if it does, then
the regulation will be dropped. In this mimicry, the low compliance
cost firm is willing to spend up to its total expected cost in resisting a
finalized regulation, which is equal to its expected compliance cost
plus the cost of pursuing judicial review. Such a pooling" or uninformative lobbying equilibrium is more likely to obtain, when the
58 Formally, cheap talk is defined in
game theory as an action that does not directly affect payoffs from the game, but affects payoffs only through the information
that such talk may convey. Whether talk is cheap depends crucially upon whether
communicated commitments are enforceable. H. Scorr BIERMAN & LuIS FERNANDEZ,
GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 131-33 (2d ed. 1998).
59 For more on pooling versus separating
equilibria in signaling games, see GINTIS,
supra note 52, at 303. "A separating equilibrium is one in which the 'type' of player
(e.g. sane/crazy) is revealed by the player's behavior, whereas a pooling equilibrium is
one in which different types of players behave in the same way." Id.
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President and Congress are more predisposed against regulation (so
that the political penalty is higher, other things equal) and lobbying
and litigation are expensive for the agency. In this uninformative,
pooling equilibrium, firms spend the minimum amount on lobbying
necessary to induce a sufficiently large political penalty so that the
regulator will not proceed. Thus in a world of very effective and costly
lobbying and litigation by regulatory targets, the regulator learns
nothing about firm type from lobbying, and, as before, has a very
strong incentive to do independent investigation into firm compliance
cost before proceeding down the regulation game tree. 6°
This is not the only potential equilibrium. Suppose that the
agency will drop the regulation if and only if it learns that the firm has
high compliance cost. This describes a regulatory process in which
the likely political cost to the agency from regulating is low, but the
probability ofjudicial reversal is strongly influenced by how much the
regulated firm spends on litigation and hence may be quite high for
sufficiently large firm litigation effort. In this case, the unique (Bayesian Perfect) 6' equilibrium calls for the high-cost firm to identify itself
and forestall regulation by making a very high lobbying expenditure.
To see this, suppose that the high-cost firm sets its lobbying expenditure just equal to its total expected cost (lobbying plus expected cost
from the litigation stage to come) if it does not succeed in using lobbying to reveal its type. Because optimal litigation and lobbying expenditures increase with the firm's compliance cost, we know that this
expenditure is more than the low-cost firm's total expected cost if the
regulation is finalized. Hence the low-cost firm will be better off if the
regulation is finalized (and then challenged by it in court) than if the
low-cost firm were to match the high-cost firm's lobbying expenditure.
In this equilibrium, the lobbying game itself screens out highcompliance-cost regulations. The only regulations that survive are
those that have relatively low compliance cost. This equilibrium arises
when the final stage litigation process is such that the agency has a
very low chance of succeeding in judicial review when the regulation
imposes high compliance costs and incentivizes the target to make
60

Note that as shown in the Appendix, Proposition 3, this pooling equilibrium is

stable, in the sense that neither a low nor high-compliance-cost firm has an incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium, uninformative lobbying expenditure, which is the
minimal expenditure. Appendix at 1419-21.
61 In a Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium, equilibrium strategies are optimal at any
given stage of the game in which they are played with positive probability, given that
players update their beliefs about the probability of different player types according to
Bayes' Rule. GINTIS, supra note 52, at 92.
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very large litigation expenditures. The sort of judicial review process
that rewards high effort levels in this way is one that is complex and
detailed, one in which even small procedural errors by the agency may
cause a court to vacate the regulation. When judges engage in such
detailed procedural review, they make no attempt to discern regulatory benefits and costs and then to balance one against the other. Yet
because such a process is very sensitive to the effort committed to it by
the regulatory target, the process benefits regulatory targets who have
a lot at stake in overturning the regulation. Additionally, because the
process differentially favors such high-compliance-cost targets, such
intensive procedural review may actually allow such targets to distinguish themselves by the high expenditures they make at the earlier,
lobbying stage of the regulatory game.
4. Winners, Losers, and Regulatory Reform
The previous analysis shows that potential regulatory targets with
low compliance cost may be the ones most at risk under a benefitsstatute-based regulatory process. When lobbying is uninformative, the
agency has a strong incentive to conduct its own independent investigation to determine the likely cost of compliance. Informative lobbying reveals that a regulatory target has low compliance cost. Regulatory targets with low compliance cost therefore not only have an
interest in concealing the fact that their compliance cost is low, but
also an interest in lobbying for statutes and rules that make it difficult
or costly for an agency to acquire compliance cost information. Even
worse, such targets would rationally oppose the efforts of highcompliance-cost firms to disclose the fact that their costs are high.
Since a (if not the) primary mechanism by which such high-cost firms
convey cost information is through their lobbying and litigation efforts, low-compliance-cost firms have an incentive to limit lobbying
and litigation expenditures, to shorten and simplify both the noticeand-comment process and the process ofjudicial review.
C. Cost-Benefit Statutes and Agency Behavior
The last set of implications suggests that the case for cost-benefit
statutes may be much more complex than is commonly supposed. Intuitively, moving from a benefits statute to a cost-benefit statute seems
to help high-compliance regulated entities by giving them a better
chance of communicating the actual cost of regulation and making
that communication count. The previous section concluded, how-
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ever, by emphasizing the incentive for low-compliance-cost regulatory
targets to resist any kind of reform that increases parties' ability to effectively communicate compliance cost information to the regulator.
This suggests that low-compliance-cost targets will be systematically
disadvantaged under cost-benefit statute relative to a benefits statute.
To explore this possibility, I modify the simple model of the preceding Section to consider how the regulation game might look under
a cost-benefit statute. There are actually two types of cost-benefit statutes, which I shall refer to as substantive and procedural. Under a substantive cost-benefit statute, the question is whether the agency actually got the cost-benefit calculus correct. Under such a statute, the
probability that a regulation is vacated depends negatively on the ratio
of benefits to costs; that is, we now must write r(L,, L? B/c) with
ar/a(B/c) < 0. Under a procedural cost-benefit statute (exemplified by
NEPA), the courts do not ask whether the agency correctly balanced
costs and benefits, but simply whether the agency incurred the cost I
to investigate and weigh costs against benefits. Under a procedural
cost-benefit statute, the probability of reversal is given by r(L., L, I)
with Or/3I < 0 (that is, the reversal probability at the judicial review
stage is lower when the agency has done the balancing than when it
has not).
1.

Substantive Cost-Benefit Statutes and Agency Incentives

The simple analytical framework I have set out here reveals immediately that even under costless and error-free judicial review,
agency incentives under a substantive cost-benefit statute are not quite
what one might have thought. A substantive cost-benefit statute instructs the agency to regulate only if the benefits of the regulation exceed its costs. Ifjudicial review of agency decision making under such
a statute is perfect, then the probability of agency reversal is 1 if B < c
and 0 if B > c. Now if the agency observed the firm's compliance cost,
then it would never regulate under a perfect substantive cost-benefit
regime unless B > c. This is because any regulation with B < c would
certainly be challenged (because judicial review is costless) and vacated by the court (because judicial review is perfect), and so the
agency would get, at best, a zero payout from promulgating the regulation.
But the agency does not observe firm compliance cost. Perfect
judicial review of the substantive cost-benefit statute does mean that
the courts will block the agency from regulating a high-compliancecost (c > B) firm. But perfect judicial review also means that the
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agency will always succeed in regulating a low-compliance-cost (c < B)
firm. The specter of certain defeat at the judicial review stage under a
perfectly reviewed substantive cost-benefit statute enhances the incentive for a low-compliance-cost target to make high, regulation-killing
investments in lobbying. 2 Such regulation-killing lobbying is more
likely if the low realization of compliance cost is higher and the
greater is the political significance of the regulation (the more sensitive is the political penalty faced by the agency if it goes ahead and finalizes the regulation). Hence in an important and non-intuitive way,
the social desirability of a perfectly reviewed substantive cost-benefit
statute depends upon politics. The smaller the impact of prefinalization lobbying-in the sense that lobbying imposes only a very
small or no penalty on the agency for regulating-the more likely it is
that the agency will always promulgate and finalize the regulation under a perfect substantive cost-benefit statute.63 On the other hand,
when the courts are very good at ex post balancing, the substantive
cost-benefit statute will incentivize firms that have low compliance cost
but lots of political influence to successfully deter regulation through
concentrated lobbying.
Thus the case for even a perfectly implemented substantive costbenefit statute is much more complex than is conventionally assumed.
Logically but not necessarily intuitively, when the firm cannot kill
regulation by lobbying, the agency always regulates under a substantive cost-benefit statute. Its regulation is vacated by the courts whenever c > B, so there is no social loss from regulating when costs exceed
benefits. Still, under the (perfect) substantive cost-benefit statute, it is
the courts rather than the agency that assumes the job of screening
As shown in the Appendix, the result that regulation-killing lobbying
is more
likely to be optimal for the firm under a perfectly reviewed substantive cost-benefit
statute than under a benefits statute depends upon how the judicial reversal function
r( differs under these alternative statutory regimes. It is true that the firm can make
all the arguments under a cost-benefit regime that it can make under a benefits regime, plus being able to argue that c > B. This might seem to imply that the firm-regardless of its compliance cost-cannot be worse off at the judicial review stage under
a cost-benefit statute then it is under a benefits statute. It can, however, in a variety of
cases. A clear case is when benefits are close to the threshold-such as "significant
risk"-required by the benefits statute (so the firm can productively argue that benefits
are too low at the judicial review stage) but compliance costs are very low relative to
benefits (so that the firm will surely lose if it tries to argue the contrary to the court).
63 To be precise, when the low-compliance-cost
firm knows that it cannot kill the
regulation with lobbying, there is no reason for it to spend any positive amount on
lobbying, since because the agency always gets a costless victory at the judicial review
stage, the firm will simply comply. Hence the agency regulates whenever p > 0, that is,
whenever it perceives any positive probability that the firm has low compliance costs.
62
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overly cosly regulation. Such a statutory regime eliminates any incentive for the agency to expend resources to do its own investigation into
regulatory compliance costs. By contrast, when applied to industries
and issues of high political salience, the substantive cost-benefit statute
will maximize the likelihood that low-compliance-cost targets kill regulation at the lobbying stage. When we recognize that the regulatory
game has both a judicial review stage and a prior, lobbying stage, we
see that the case for substantive cost-benefit statutes depends not just
upon the ability of courts to implement such statutes on judicial review, but on politics. Ironically, a regime that is often defended as
one that will get political influence out of the regulatory process 64 may
actually make politics determinative.
Costless and error-free judicial review is, however, not only unrealistic, but also contrary to the spirit of the benefits statute analysis developed earlier, which presumed that the judicial review reversal
probability depends upon the respective litigation expenditures of the
target and the agency. In line with this benefits model, consider the
more general case, where the reversal probability depends negatively
on the ratio of benefits and costs, B/c (that is, r, < 0). Figure 2 depicts
this relationship between r and B/c.65
Figure 2: Reversal Probability Under Imperfect Judicial Review
of a Substantive Cost-Benefit Statute
r(B/c)

B/c
64 See Krier, supra note 17, at 1232-33 (arguing that an "out
in the open" consideration of costs is preferable to consideration "sub rosa, on the pretense that calculations are being ignored"); Thompson, supra note 17, at 1156 ("[N]o one can argue
that our current system of covert, indirect consideration of costs is better than direct
consideration.").
65 The relationship depicted by Figure 2 is quite general, in
the sense that to be
even minimally rational, substantive judicial review under a substantive cost-benefit
statute should be such that for any given level of litigation effort, the high-cost target
has a better chance of getting the regulation vacated than does a low-cost target. This
is just to say that substantive judicial review is not totally random: that the actual costs
and benefits of regulation actually influence the probability of judicial reversal of a
regulation written to implement a statute commanding cost-benefit-justified regulations.

1374

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150:1343

Because judges make errors in determining the ratio B/c, there is
a positive probability that even a high-cost target will be regulated.
For this reason, both high- and low-compliance-cost target types have
an incentive to resist regulation at the lobbying stage as well as afterward in the judicial review stage. Incentives at the lobbying stage are,
as before, determined by anticipated outcomes at the judicial review
stage to follow. One might suppose that even under imperfect judicial
review, the low-compliance-cost target has more at stake (higher expected total cost) at the judicial review stage than does the highcompliance-cost target. It is indeed true that the cheaper and more
accurate the judicial review process under a substantive cost-benefit
statute, the more likely it is that the low-cost target does have greater
total expected cost if the regulation is finalized. Additionally, a
cheaper and more accurate judicial review process more likely produces an equilibrium in which either the low-cost type kills the regulation with very high lobbying, or simply concedes. More generally,
however, since both types of regulatory targets spend at the lobbying
stage, and the low-cost target actually spends more than under a benefits statute, the lobbying spending that the agency expects to encounter will be higher under a cost-benefit statute than under a benefits
statute. The higher the expected target lobbying expenditure, the
higher the agency's political penalty if it goes ahead with the regulation. The higher the agency's political penalty, the lower its perceived
net benefit from regulating. Thus under imperfect judicial review,
some of what a substantive cost-benefit statute appears to give the
agency-an increased likelihood that the regulation will withstand judicial review when the target has low cost-is taken away by rational
target behavior at the earlier lobbying stage.
The cheaper and more accurate the judicial review process, the
more a substantive cost-benefit statute really generates different outcomes at the final judicial review stage than does a benefits statute,
and the greater the difference in the incentives created by these alternative regimes. Flipping the point of view and taking the judicial review process as fixed, the case for substantive cost-benefit statutes can
be seen as dependent upon the distribution of regulatory compliance
costs. The best case for substantive cost-benefit statutes arises when
the distribution of compliance cost is strongly bimodal (in my discrete
case, either very high or very low) and centered around the agency's
perceived benefit. Under such a distribution, both the agency and the
court are unlikely to err in balancing costs and benefits. Even if the
agency overstates benefits, when costs are very low, benefits likely ex-
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ceed costs; when costs are very high, even the agency likely will perceive that costs exceed benefits. On judicial review, error is unlikely.
When compliance cost is very low, the court is very unlikely to vacate
the agency's rule incorrectly (i.e., there is a low probability of a false
negative on judicial review). When compliance cost is very high, the
court would be very likely to vacate if the agency regulated. With only
extreme realizations of compliance cost, imperfect judicial review approximates closely perfectjudicial review.
The worst case for substantive cost benefit arises when compliance
cost is unimodal and is tightly centered around the agency's perceived
benefit. In this case,judicial errors of both types are likely. The court
is likely to vacate the regulation of a low-compliance-cost target (which
should be regulated, on cost-benefit grounds) and to uphold the
regulation of a high-compliance-cost target (which should not be
regulated, on cost-benefit grounds). When both false positivesincorrect findings by the court that benefits were bigger than costs
and so the agency should be upheld-and false negatives-incorrect
findings by the court that benefits were less than costs and so the
regulation should be vacated-are likely, the actual ratio of benefits to
costs becomes increasingly insignificant in influencing the outcome of
judicial review. The substantive cost-benefit regime collapses into a
costly version of the benefits regime-costly because both costs and
benefits are at issue.
2. Procedural Cost-Benefit Statutes and Agency Incentives
Procedural cost-benefit statutes are exemplified by section 102(C)
of the NEPA. NEPA requires that the agency prepare an environmental impact statement for "major federal actions" having a "significant" impact on the environment.6 To survive judicial review under
NEPA, agencies must be able to show that they have prepared an EIS
if one was required and used that EIS in a good-faith attempt to balance the environmental costs of a federal program against the program's benefits. 61 Procedural cost-benefit statutes such as NEPA do
Section 102(C) of NEPA requires that all federal agencies "include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement...
on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)
(1994).
67 As the D.C. Circuit
explained:
[R]eviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under [NEPA], unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and
66
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not tell agencies to regulate only if benefits exceed costs, but rather
provide that the agency must incur the cost of determining costs and
balancing those costs against regulatory benefits. Such statutes merely
mandate a balancing process, without saying anything about how that
balancing should be done.
In terms of the more formal approach developed here, procedural cost-benefit statutes make the agency's reversal probability r a
function of whether the agency incurred the cost I of determining
regulatory compliance cost. In reviewing agency decision making under a procedural cost-benefit statute, the question for courts is not
whether the agency got the cost-benefit calculus right, but rather
whether the agency incurred the cost I of investigating regulatory
costs and balancing them against regulatory benefits. In general, the
more careful and thorough the agency's balancing process (the bigger
I is), the lower the probability of reversal under a procedural costbenefit statute. 68 The key incentives created by such a statute can be
seen by considering a special case in which by investing I, the agency
certainly learns the target's compliance cost, and invests I, and is assured that the regulation will survive (cosfless) judicial review if defended by the agency at that stage.
In this special case of perfect and cosfless judicial review of rulemaking under a procedural cost-benefit statute, if the agency does not
invest I in its own ex ante balancing, then it is sure to lose at the judicial review stage. With certain victory at that stage, all types of firms
successively will seek judicial review, and so the agency gets a zero
payout from regulating. Hence under such a statute, the agency never
regulates when it fails to invest I > 0 and balance ex ante. By investing
I, the agency ensures that it will win on judicial review. But the agency
does not actually regulate unless the firm either cannot kill the regulation by lobbying or finds it cheaper to comply than to kill the regulation by lobbying. That is, the agency will not engage in costly ex ante
investigation into and balancing of firm compliance cost, unless it expects to finalize the regulation successfully.
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of courts to reverse.
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The view that NEPA requires balancing but does not
say how the balance should be struck (that is, NEPA is not substantive) was affirmed in
Strycker's Bay NeighborhoodCouncil, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
68 For an analysis of this general case, see Part I.E of the Appendix.
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The comparative performance of a procedural cost-benefit statute
thus depends upon how the tremendous weight given to ex ante
agency balancing by such a statute affects the lobbying process. As
explained in the Appendix, certain victory at the final stage maximizes
the agency's incentive to invest in costly lobbying to preserve the net
benefit of regulating. For the same reasons, the procedural costbenefit statute minimizes the productivity of firm lobbying. That is,
given that the agency has invested I, the procedural cost-benefit statute minimizes the possibility that the firm kills the regulation with
high lobbying effort relative to the other statutory regimes.
The problem with a perfect procedural cost-benefit statute is that
it may attach too much weight to whether the agency balanced costs
and benefits ex ante. If even a minimal ex ante expenditure Iguarantees the agency success at the judicial review stage, then the agency
will regulate regardless of the net social benefit, and even when its
own perceived benefit is small. The model thus would seem to confirm the skeptical intuition that the only thing accomplished by a procedural cost-benefit statute such as NEPA is to create an incentive for
pro forma agency balancing, with little or no effect on the type or
quantity of agency projects proposed.
That reading or intuition, however, misinterprets the model. Just
like ex post lobbying, ex ante regulatory cost-benefit balancing is
costly. The cost required is, moreover, not fixed, but rather determined by the courts as they interpret the procedural cost-benefit statute. The higher the level of ex ante investigation and/or balancing I
required by the courts in interpreting the procedural cost-benefit
statute, the bigger must be the regulator's net benefit for it to regulate. Indeed, by construing procedural cost-benefit statutes as requiring agencies to conduct a very costly and searching inquiry into compliance costs, courts may deter overregulation significantly.
In
particular, when the agency's perceived benefit B systematically
overstates the actual social benefit of regulation, a tough ex ante balancing requirement will effectively screen out regulations that have
small or even negative net social benefit.
An additional virtue of a procedural cost-benefit statute is that
even when subject to imperfect judicial review, such a statute maximizes an agency's incentive to spend Ito determine the firm's compliance cost. To see why, recall that under a benefits statute, the agency
often will have a relatively weak incentive to acquire costly information
about firm compliance cost even when lobbying is uninformative.
This weakness arises when the judicial review process is relatively in-
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sensitive to the amount that compliance targets spend attacking the
regulation and there is a fairly high probability that the firm has low
compliance cost (and hence will not mount much of fight) anyway.
Observe that in this case, the agency would not regulate if it knew that

the firm has high compliance cost. By greatly increasing the marginal
benefit to the agency of acquiring information about target compliance cost, the procedural cost-benefit statute may cause the agency to69
learn compliance cost when it would not under the benefits statute.
Since by assumption the agency will not regulate in this case if it
learns that compliance cost is high, the procedural cost-benefit statute

will reduce the chance that the agency regulates a high-compliancecost target, relative to the pure benefits statute.
II. EXTENSIONS
A. Shifting the LitigationCost Burden

My analysis has thus far assumed that it is the regulatory agency
that bears the cost of defending the regulation at the judicial review

stage. By statutory requirement, however, the office of General Attorney has authority over all federal regulatory agency litigation.

Justice

Department litigators, rather than regulatory agency counsel, have
exercised historically varying degrees of control over regulatory litigation.7 Still, the fact that regulatory agencies do not bear all of the liti-

gation stage cost is a potentially important variation on my maintained
assumptions. Modifying the model developed above to take account
69

The model thus confirms an informal prediction made byJohn A. Ferejohn, The
Structure of Agency Decision Process, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLIcY 441, 447-48
(Mathew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987), regarding the impact of NEPA.
70 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515-519, 547 (1994) (reserving power over the conduct of
agency litigation in the Supreme Court to the Department ofJustice).
71 In the eyes of their critics, DOJ litigators are lawyers "without a client, favoring
their roles as advocates over their roles as advisers, and unconstrained by the demands
of time, money or available lawyers." W. Perry Pendley, No Clients, No Responsibility,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1988, at 17. As a legal matter, of course, DOJ attorneys do have
clients-the agencies that they represent. Still, as Barbara Allen Babcock observes, by
statute, central litigating authority is in the Attorney General, not regulatory agencies,
and those agencies are captive clients who cannot change lawyers. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the CivilDivision, 23J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181,
185 (1990). As a practical matter, the extent of actual attorney general control over
litigation has tended to reflect more general efforts by the Executive to exert more
centralized control over regulatory agencies. See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction: Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in GOvERNMENT LAWYERS 1, 8-9 (Cornell W. Clayton ed.,
1995) ("As with other areas of the administrative state, centralizing control over agency
legal work meant strengthening presidential influence over it.").
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of this fact might seem to be a simple matter. Absent some internal
cost-allocation method-whereby agency budgets are debited the
amount spent on their behalf by the Justice Department-the Justice
Department acts to substantially subsidize agency litigation expenses.
Full subsidization of agency litigation expenditures would cause the
agency to finalize any regulation from which it expected positive net
benefits given the political penalty. More precisely, if the agency
bears none of the litigation cost, then the risk of high regulatory compliance cost that triggers very costly litigation at the judicial review
stage does little to create an incentive for the agency to learn target
compliance cost ahead of time.
This is overly simplistic. Department ofJustice litigators presumably do not perceive or realize the same benefits from agency regulations as do the regulators themselves.72 There is in fact little if any
empirical work on precisely what might determine Department ofJustice litigation expenditures across case type.73 Given this paucity of
evidence, a reasonable assumption is that while Justice Department
litigators have some idea of the stakes involved, their litigation effort
tends to vary much less with the actual net regulatory benefits than
would the regulatory agency's. 74 This means that Justice Department
lawyers tend to overinvest in defending relatively unimportant regulations (as measured by the agency's perceived net benefit) and underinvest in defending relatively significant regulations.
From the regulatory agency's point of view, subsidized litigation
72 For a concrete example, see the discussion
in Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The
Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency LitigationAuthority, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 209-10 (1998), of the way in which the Department ofJustice's
position in Public Research Group v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995), diverged
from EPA's position on that same case. My focus here is on the standard-setting game;
DOJ and agency incentives differ at least as much when it comes to regulatory enforcement. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJControlof Litigation
on Agencies's Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2000) ("Allowing DOJ to control
agency litigation ... reduce[s] the scope and effectiveness of agency enforcement.").
For a more general discussion of the differences in outlook and incentives between
agency counsel and DOJ litigators, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY:
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 39-67 (1977),
which argues that the sharpest conflicts arise at the appellate stage ofjudicial review.
73 For an important exception, finding evidence of very strong selection effects in
solicitor general decisions on whether to apply for certiorari, see Linda R. Cohen &
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implicationsfor the Law, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 391, 395-96 (2000).
74 For an interesting argument that centralization of litigation
in the Justice Department is intended precisely to prevent such congressional influence on agency litigation decisions, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice Litigation: Externalizing
Costs and Searchingfor Subsidies, 161 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 186 (1998).
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expense has two primary effects (relative to the world where the
agency internalizes the full cost of litigation). The most significant is
the underinvestment problem. When compliance costs are high, the
target will invest a great deal in litigating to vacate or modify the regulation. With a very costly but-from the agency's point of view-socially valuable regulation, the agency would also invest a substantial
amount in litigation. Department ofJustice officials who do not fully
internalize the social benefit from regulating will not invest nearly so
much. The agency will perceive a much higher probability of reversal
than if it controlled the litigation. Hence it will perceive (for any
given political cost) a lower net benefit from pursuing the regulation.
Costly regulations that bring big net social benefits will be made less
likely by the delegation of litigation to the Justice Department.
The overinvestment problem causes more or less the reverse phenomenon. If compliance cost is low, then Justice Department litigators may succeed often in defending regulations, even when the regulatory benefits are small relative to costs. Because the agency bears
only a fraction of the litigation costs, delegation to the Justice Department creates a much stronger incentive for the agency to pursue
regulations that impose relatively low costs-even if the benefits are
small as well-because the agency can anticipate that many such regulations will be defended successfully by the Department of Justice.
Delegation of litigation expenses tends to clog the courts with litigation over regulations that regulatory agencies would not defend, and
therefore not finalize in the first place, if they had to bear the full cost
ofjudicial review.
B.

Uncertainty and Incomplete Information About
Regulatory Benefits and Costs

My analysis thus far has been simplified by assuming that while the
regulator has only incomplete information about the target's compliance cost (knowing only the probability that the cost is, respectively,
high or low), the regulator's benefit is known to all strategic actors in
the regulation game. There are two ways that this assumption can be
generalized. One way is to suppose that regulators have better information about regulatory benefits than do regulatory targets. (This
may be true even if outside interest groups have provided the impetus
for the regulation, because outside groups lobbying for regulation
have a strong incentive to persuade the agency that benefits are high.)
Even more generally-and as a moment's reflection upon health,
safety and environmental regulation shows-very often both regula-
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tory benefits and costs are uncertain to both the regulator and the
regulatory target.
1. Two-Sided Incomplete Information
Regardless of the statutory regime-benefits, substantive or procedural cost-benefits-the regulatory agency risks reversal at the judicial review stage if it cannot demonstrate a statutorily required level of
benefits, such as that the regulation helps to lessen a "significant risk
of harm, 5 or protects human health with an "adequate margin of
safety." 6 For this reason, it is not credible for an agency to propose a
regulation unless the agency first believes that it can make a plausible
case that the benefits promised by the regulation are sufficiently high.
In more technical, game-theoretic language, the fact that an agency
even reaches the stage of proposing a regulation is itself a credible
signal that the agency perceives nontrivial benefits from the regulation.
The ability of the agency to drop a regulation after the lobbying
stage, however, makes the regulatory proposal itself a relatively weak
signal of the agency's information about the magnitude of regulatory
benefits. The option to drop means that the initial proposal decision
is not overly costly to the agency even if the regulation does not have
particularly high benefits: if the agency observes a high level of lobbying expenditure by the regulatory target, indicating high compliance
costs, then it can drop the regulation and save further expense. For
this same reason, an agency decision to commit significant resources
to the defense of the regulation at the lobbying stage may be a credible signal to the regulatory target that the agency perceives very large
benefits from the regulation, and hence will continue in the game, to
finalize the regulation and then defend it in court. Thus just as regulatory target lobbying can inform the agency about target compliance
cost, so too can agency lobbying inform targets about the agency's
perceived regulatory benefit. As a positive matter, high lobbying expenditures by the agency should often deter low compliance cost
firms from fighting the regulation.
As for the effect of incomplete regulatory benefits information on
75This was the administrator's interpretation of language in section 211 (c) (1) (A)

of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c) (1) (A) (1994), authorizing the EPA to regulate gasoline additives whose emission products will endanger the public health or welfare, which was upheld in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
76This is required of the EPA in setting primary ambient air quality standards under section 109 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (1994).
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the choice among our three alternative statutory regimes, it is helpful
to recall first how a substantive cost-benefit statute creates very strong
incentive for low compliance cost firms to expend large amounts in
lobbying to kill the regulation. This is because such firms are very
likely to lose in the judicial review stage, or simply to concede and
comply if they fail to kill the regulation by lobbying. Incomplete information as to regulatory benefits can have a similar effect on agency
incentives. Under any statutory regime I have considered, as the
agency's chances of being reversed in judicial review increase, its expected regulatory benefits decrease. This suggests that the agency
may have an informational incentive to make high lobbying expenditures. The informational incentive arises when the agency wishes to
conceal the fact that regulatory benefits are actually quite low. The
reason for making such expenditures is to induce the regulatory target to concede. Such an equilibrium arises when the target's costs are
sufficiently low; it will only fight the regulation in court if it knows for
sure that the agency will not fight hard in court because its perceived
benefit is low.
The important policy question is whether and if the choice of
statutory regime affects incentives for costly and socially unproductive
lobbying by regulatory agencies with asymmetric information as to
regulatory benefits. Significantly, the incentive for an agency to make
such large, concealing lobbying expenditures to induce the target to
comply may disappear under substantive cost-benefit statutes. It will
do so if the agency's benefit is big enough so that the low compliance
cost target loses even when the agency benefit is relatively low. If the
target concedes if the regulation is finalized no matter what it learns
about regulatory benefits, then a low benefit agency does not need to
conceal its type. If, conversely, the low agency benefit type has such
low benefits that the target will win in court under the substantive
cost-benefit statute, then the target will not concede if it learns that
the agency has low benefit, and hence the agency still has an incentive
for concealing lobbying expenditures. Thus moving to a substantive
cost-benefit statute may deter the agency from making very high,
benefit-concealing lobbying expenditures, but only if the agency
benefits are sufficiently high that the agency can expect to win in judicial review under the substantive cost-benefit statute.
2.

Uncertain Costs and Benefits: Cooperative
Aspects of the Regulation Game

Health, safety, and environmental regulation typically involve
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benefits and costs that are known with precision by neither the regulator nor the entities it seeks to regulate. When the regulator is uncertain about the benefits, and the target about the costs of regulation,
the regulatory process provides an opportunity for learning about
costs and benefits. The acquisition of information may be mutually
beneficial to regulator and target. If the regulator knew that the
benefits of a proposed regulation were low and its compliance costs
high, then the regulator might be better off discarding the regulation
entirely, rather than incurring even the cost of proposal.
It might seem that the regulatory process, at least as I have modeled it thus far, is so adversarial that it does not permit credible communication between regulator and target. It is indeed true that on
the asymmetric information version of the model, there may be, as
shown above, a very strong incentive for concealing lobbying expenditure by regulator, target, or both. The strategic incentive for the regulator to deceive the target into thinking that regulatory benefits are
high, and the corresponding incentive for the target to deceive the
regulator into thinking that its compliance costs are high, is likely always to predominate at later stages of the regulatory process, when
each side has gained private information regarding either benefits or
costs. At earlier stages, however, it is possible that both sides will gain
by cooperating to generate better information about benefits and
costs.
To see how this may be so, consider the following example. Suppose all that the regulator and the target know about regulatory benefits at the outset of the regulation game is that they are equally likely
to be either $25 or $125, while costs are equally likely to be either $40
or $100. (Observe that in expected net benefit terms, the regulation
is marginally valuable, generating an expected net benefit of (.5)(25 +
125) - (.5)(40 + 100) = 75 - 70 = $5). Assume that the lobbying and litigation game conflict functions DO and rO are such that the regulator
would not propose to regulate if it knew that the benefits were only
$25, yet it would regulate no matter what the costs if it knew that the
benefits were $125, regardless of the statutory regime in place. Suppose now that by hiring engineers, scientists, and other experts, uncertainty over regulatory benefits can be eliminated. From a regulatory target's point of view, the return on investing to eliminate
regulatory uncertainty and sharing the information discovered with
the regulator comes from the 50% probability that it will discover
regulatory benefits of only $25. When such low benefits are communicated credibly and verifiably to the regulator, it will not regulate.
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This means that if it is sufficiently cheap to eliminate uncertainty,
then the regulatory target may itself have an incentive to do so. Just
how cheap is cheap enough depends upon the return from uncertainty elimination. This return is equal to the difference in the target's expected cost with and without uncertainty. To find this return
using the numbers in this example, the expected cost to the regulator
target from regulation cannot be bigger than its expected cost of
compliance, which is given by (.5)(40) + (.5)(100) = 70. It is regulated
only when the benefits turn out to be $125, which occurs with a 50%
probability. Therefore the expected cost to the target when it learns
and reveals the actual regulatory benefit is less than or equal to $35.
If the target did not invest to learn or reveal the actual regulatory
benefit, then its expected compliance cost would be $70. The target
thus would secure a 50% reduction in expected compliance costs by
investing to learn and communicating the true social benefit of regulation.
The crucial assumption underlying this sanguine example is that
not all uncertainty can be eliminated. In general, any significant reduction in uncertainty over benefits or costs will forestall some regulation. The crucial assumption is rather that the target can communicate credibly and verifiably what it has learned about regulatory
benefits to the regulator. If the information conveyed by the target
cannot be verified, then the target would have an obvious incentive to
generate studies indicating a low regulatory benefit of $25; the purpose of such an action would be to forestall regulation. The regulator
would not attach any credibility to the target's studies, and we would
be back to the game of pure strategic conflict analyzed earlier.
As a matter of positive or predictive theory, the most important
implication of this example (and counterexamples that may be constructed) is that the greater the extent to which uncertainty over regulatory costs and benefits may be credibly and verifiably reduced, the
stronger is the incentive for both the regulator and regulatory targets
to make such costly uncertainty-reducing investments. This translates
directly into institutional design. Both sides in the regulation game
may gain enormously from reducing uncertainty about regulatory
benefits and costs, but this requires the creation of an expdrt evaluative body, independent of both the regulator and the regulated entity,
and with no stake in how its findings are used.
C. Endogenous Objectives: The Regulatory Game as an End in Itself
It is important to stress that all of the theoretical results discussed
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thus far presume that the regulatory agency benefits, or suffers a political penalty, if and only if the agency finalizes a regulation that actually survives judicial review and is implemented. For a variety of reasons, this may well not be the case.
The first possibility arises when one of the model's assumptions
about the political penalty structure is changed to suppose that the
agency suffers a political penalty regardless of whether it finalizes the
regulation. The regulation game model reveals that, from the point
of view of Congress, such a response makes little sense. If the agency
suffers a political penalty (for example, present or future budgetary
reductions or costly oversight hearings) just for proposing the regulation, then it has no reason other than anticipated judicial review problems not to finalize any regulation that it proposes. Congress loses a
substantial amount in controlling agency rulemaking if its sanctions
are triggered by proposed as well as finalized rulemaking.
A second possibility occurs when the agency gets a benefit from
the regulatory process itself, just from proposing a regulation, regardless of whether the regulation is finalized. To see why this is very plausible, consider an agency that is known to be under budgetary pressure, so that its ability to lobby successfully for any regulation is quite
limited. Suppose further that there is an identifiable class of regulatory beneficiaries, such as labor unions or environmental groups that
are highly informed about the structure and incentives in the regulation game. These groups realize that the agency will not finalize a desired regulation unless they-the actual beneficiaries-are prepared
to commit substantial sums to the lobbying game. In such a case, the
agency may be under political pressure to propose regulations in a
certain area, and may benefit politically by so doing regardless of
whether the regulation is ultimately finalized and implemented. Such
a situation is actually the flip side of the political penalty modeled
above. Just as congressional members representing regulatory targets
might inflict present and future budgetary penalties on the agency for
finalizing a regulation, so too might congressional members representing regulatory beneficiaries reward the agency for proposing a
regulation, even if it is ultimately defeated.
III. POSITIvE APPLICATIONS
A. EmpiricalSupportfor the Model's Predictions
The model developed above generates a number of testable predictions. While my primary purpose here is not to provide a detailed
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empirical study of regulation, anecdotal support for some of the
model's primary predictions isolates many of the important strategic
incentives in the regulation game.
1. Procedural Cost-Benefit Statutes and Agency Behavior
In analyzing procedural cost-benefit statutes, I presented the National Environmental Policy Act as the paradigm for such a statute.
To recall, section 102 of the Act requires federal project agencies to
prepare a detailed statement balancing environmental impact against
project benefits for major federal projects with potentially significant
environmental impact. Even though it is merely procedural-requiring agencies to balance environmental costs against project benefitsNEPA has had a surprisingly discernible impact on the behavior of
federal project agencies.
To understand this success requires a bit of background. From
1945 until the late 1960s, an amazingly small group of powerful
congressmen and federal bureaucrats transformed the American environment by spending billions of taxpayer dollars on hundreds of
thousands of federal projects. These projects brought highly concentrated benefits but diffuse costs.77 If a single industrial sector can take
credit for energizing late-twentieth-century federal environmental legislation, that sector is the federal government. The primary actors in
this great American environmental transformation were not private
companies, but federal project agencies: the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, and
the Department of Defense. 8
In terms of the model developed above, these agencies implemented benefits statutes. Until the 1970s, the Reclamation Act, Federal Power Act, Rivers and Harbors Act, and various agricultural assistance acts were all pure benefits statutes, with no requirement that
project agencies balance environmental costs against project benefits. 79 The projects developed by these agencies and funded by Con-

77 See generally THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEES
(Ralph Nader Cong. Project ed.,
1975) (describing the powerful interior, agricultural, and space congressional committees).
78 For a detailed and historically sensitive discussion
of the enormous role played
by these federal project agencies in eliminating wetlands and helping to provoke the
late-twentieth-century environmental movement, see ANN VILEISis, DISCOVERING THE
UNKNOWN LANDSCAPE: A HISTORY OF AM ERICA'S WETLANDS 195-252 (1997).
79 See Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16
U.S.C. § 803(a) (2000) (focusing on benefits
to interstate commerce rather than costs to the environment); Rivers and Harbors Act
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gress may be thought of as "regulations" that generated very concentrated benefits but diffuse costs. The costs were primarily in the form
of harm, often catastrophic, to publicly held resources-rivers, forests,
marshes, floodplains, and ecosystems in general. It took some time
for regulatory cost-bearers to take collective action. Federal resource
or environmental agencies such as the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service were the first organizations to actively oppose federal development projects. But as the woeful history of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act 0 illustrates, the resource agencies enjoyed only limited success in persuading project agency administration, the executive, or legislature that Cold War-era federal projects had sufficiently
8
high environmental costs to warrant their cancellation. '
As is well known, NEPA's requirement-that all federal agencies
prepare an environmental impact statement on major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the environment-is purely proNEPA does not tell federal project agencies how much
cedural.
weight should be attached to environmental costs, but just that the
agencies must explicitly and publicly balance those costs against project benefits. In determining whether those costs are "significant"
enough to require an EIS, federal project agencies are under execu§ 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994) (focusing on the accrual of benefits to the government

rather than possible costs to the environment).
80 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (2000).
81 As observed by Samuel P. Hays, the Fish and Wildlife Service objected to dozens
of federal projects during the 1960s and finally did succeed in persuading Congressman Dingell to draft legislation that would have required the Army Corps of Engineers
to seek approval from the Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing a dredge-and-fill
permit. Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Environmental Administration, in THE NEW
AMERICAN STATE: BUREAUCRACIES AND POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 21, 34-35

(Louis Galambos ed., 1987). Although similar in many ways to NEPA-as in requiring
federal project agencies to consult with and consider the recommendations of fish and
wildlife agencies-the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act did not require anything like
NEPA's formal environmental impact statement. Furthermore, under the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, there was no White House Council on Environmental Quality to explain the technicalities of consultation and consideration. By the late 1960s, it
was clear to all observers that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act had produced
virtually no impact on federal project agency behavior. See Michael Veiluva, The Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act in Environmental Litigation, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489, 491

(1981) ("A reassessment of FWCA by Congress and members of the Executive Branch
in the early 1970's [sic] revealed failures at every step of the FWCA process: federal
action agencies had failed to consult adequately with FWS and often glossed over or
ignored impacts on wildlife .... (footnote omitted)).

See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (reasoning that preparation of an environmental impact statement was procedural, and that consideration of the environmental consequences of a decision was all
that was required under NEPA).
82
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tive instructions to consider not only the magnitude and distribution
of costs, but also whether the costs will be "controversial."83 An
agency's failure to prepare an EIS, or its preparation of an insuffi-

ciently detailed EIS, is grounds for judicial reversal of project approval. In this way, NEPA functions to open and politicize federal
project agency cost-benefit calculus.
The most obvious consequence of NEPA, predicted by the model
developed above, is that federal project agencies have hired ecologists
and other professional scientists, and have invested significant
amounts to learn about the environmental costs of their projects. 84
Also predicted by the model is the finding that although the statute
has "made agencies take a hard look at the environmental consequences of their actions," some agencies "act as if the detailed statement called for in the statute is an end in itself, rather than a tool to
enhance and improve decision-making. 8 5 On my model, a transformation in the statutory environment does not by itself alter agency
preferences. The agency invests to determine regulatory costs for strategic reasons because, by so doing, it increases the probability that the
regulatory program or government project, as in the case of NEPA,
will survive judicial review.
By requiring that environmental impact statements be made publicly available, NEPA has also altered the lobbying stage of the regulatory game. Here, NEPA has directly altered the informational environment under which lobbying about federal projects occurs. For a
demonstration of this change, take for example the paradigmatic
"bad" federal project-one with relatively small but highly concentrated benefits, and large but very diffuse costs. Suppose that federal
project managers prefer to do the project because they get political
benefits from so doing (conferring benefits on a small number of politically helpful members of Congress). The best way for those managers to minimize political costs is to conceal and hide the fact that
any costs exist, and to get the project approved and underway before
the costs are even generally appreciated. That is, absent NEPA, federal project managers used their superior information about project
83 Council on Environmental Quality regulations
instruct agencies to use a very
broad lens when deciding what might constitute a "significant" environmental impact.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2001) ("[T]he significance of an action must be analyzed in
several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the
affected interests, and the locality.").
84 COUNCIL ON ENVrL. QUALITIY, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Acr: A

STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TwENTY-FrvE YEARs 27 (1997).
85

"

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

20021

1389

benefits and costs essentially to derail opposition at the lobbying stage.
By requiring the disclosure of significant environmental impacts,
NEPA opens up the lobbying process and transforms the agency's
perceived political benefits and political costs.
Thus, on my model, one would predict that NEPA's greatest effect
would be in altering federal project agency decisions between the
stage of project proposal and project finalization. To be more precise,
NEPA should have relatively little effect on decisions to proceed with
finalized projects, but many proposed projects should have been
dropped by project agencies as a result of changes in the agency's
perceived political benefits and costs due to lobbying. This is indeed
perhaps the central finding of Mazmanian and Nienaber's study of the
impact of NEPA on the Army Corps of Engineers. s6 They found that,
while few Corps projects in the final planning stages have been halted
as a result of NEPA, by May 1973 (roughly four years after its passage),
87
175 Corps projects had been modified as a result of NEPA. Many of
the modifications led to "significantly different" projects than those
that had first been proposed. NEPA has been effective precisely because it has forced project sponsors to reveal information to project
cost-bearers, information that has facilitated the lobbying-stage game
and transformed the implementation of federal project statutes."" In

DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE?:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, AND THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
86

180-94 (1979).
87
88

Id. at 184-85.
As described in detail by Bradley C. Karkkainnen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Moni-

toring and Managing Government'sEnvironmental Performance,102 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002), one of the ways that agencies have responded to NEPA's costly environmental impact statement requirement is by considering a variety of ways to mitigate
a project's environmental impact in an initial (and much cheaper) Environmental Assessment. Such assessments typically find that there is no need for a full EIS because
the project, as mitigated, will not have a significant impact on the environment. While
difficult to prove conclusively, a number of knowledgeable commentators express confidence that this conventional practice is not a technical way around NEPA, but rather
evidence that NEPA has actually caused federal project agencies to rethink and redesign their projects to lessen their environmental costs. See Albert I. Herson, ProjectMitigation Revisited: Most Courts Approve Findings of No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 68 (1986) (finding that those agencies whose mitigation
efforts alleviated the need for a full EIS "had adequately demonstrated the efficacy of
proposed mitigation measures"); Karkkainnen, supra (manuscript at 8) (arguing that
agencies may use environmental assessments "to avoid especially harmful projects,
choose less environmentally harmful variants, add mitigation measures, or select and
design projects with greater initial sensitivity to environmental concerns"); Geoffrey T.
McDonald & Lex Brown, Going Beyond Environmental Impact Assessment: Environmental
Input to Planningand Design, 15 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 483, 487 (1995).
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other words, NEPA has restored the incentives ordinarily created by
benefits statutes for regulatory cost-bearers to politically advocate project costs.
2.

Substantive Cost-Benefit Statutes and Lobbying Expenditures

The analytical framework developed above implies a non-intuitive
relationship between substantive cost-benefit statutes and lobbying.
One might suppose that the success of a regulatory target group in
persuading Congress to explicitly require agency cost-benefit analysis
means that those targets will then spend less during the lobbying stage
of the regulatory game. My model shows that precisely the opposite is
likely to occur: substantive cost-benefit statutes and lobbying are
complements, rather than substitutes. Under a substantive costbenefit statute, low-compliance-cost regulatory targets have little
chance of succeeding at the judicial review stage once a regulation is
finalized. Thus targets have an enhanced incentive to lobby against
promulgation.
This prediction is dramatically confirmed by the legal and political history of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).89 That law requires the registration of all pesticides sold or
distributed in the United States. In order to register a pesticide, a
FIFRA applicant must show that the product can be used without causing "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," 90 which the
statute defines as "unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide." 91
FIFRA has been interpreted by the courts as imposing substantive
cost-benefit requirements: that is, as permitting legal challenges to
agency rulemaking not just on the ground that the agency failed to
consider costs, but on the ground that the agency failed to strike the
correct balance between costs and benefits. 92 In understanding
89

7 U.S.C. §§

90 7

136 136

-

y (2000).

U.S.C. § 136a(c) (5) (D) (2000).
91 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb)
(2000).
92 See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) ("FIFRA
registration is a cost-benefit analysis that no unreasonable risk exists to man or the environment taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also
Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The FIFRA standard distinctly
balances the environmental harm of using a pesticide against its economic, social, and
environmental benefits."); Atochem N. Am. v. EPA, 759 F. Supp. 861, 870-71 (D.D.C.
1991) (applying the statutory standard that applicants must consider if there will be
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FIFRA, it is important to know that up until the 1960s, the primary
public concern about pesticides was their effect on the environment,
not human health. 3 The Department of Agriculture, which had acted
as the primary government sponsor of pesticide research and had
heavily promoted pesticide use, was also charged with the task of determining which pesticides would be regulated. Unsurprisingly, between 1947 and 1963, the Department of Agriculture registered
roughly fifty-five thousand separate products containing pesticides,
and only twenty-three of which were registered "under protest" due to
health or environmental concerns.94 When new pesticide legislation
was finally passed in 1972, registration authority was moved from Agriculture to the newly created Environmental Protection Agency. The
standard for registration, however, was revised to the "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment" language still found in FIFRA.95
Even more importantly, the law required the cost-benefit test to be
applied not only to new registrations, but also to re-registrations of the
nearly sixty thousand compounds that the Department of Agriculture
had already registered.96
In going about the task of analyzing the costs and benefits of reregistering pesticides, the EPA started with benefits data-data showing pesticide effectiveness that manufacturers had supplied to the Department of Agriculture in support of the initial registration. 97 Pesticide manufacturers also provided information about costs-the
environmental and health effects from various pesticides. As late as
1983, the EPA did not even have the ability to audit such cost data effectively. 9'
FIFRA provides built-in flexibility to lobbying pressure. Not only
does FIFRA provide for the indemnification of costs incurred by a
manufacturer whose pesticide is deregistered, but it also gives the EPA

unreasonable risks to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the pesticide).
93 JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S Toxic LEGACY: How SCIENCE
AND LAW FAIL TO
PROTECT Us FROM PESTICIDES 78-85 (1996).
94 Id. at
81.
95 See supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (providing the statutory definition
of
the "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" language).
96 See WARGO, supra note 93, at 89-91 (explaining the enormous risk
assessment
problem for EPA in reregistering the previously registered products).
97 See id. at 94 (describing the overwhelming task of reviewing "the truckloads
of
poorly organized data submitted by manufacturers to support registrations").
V See id. at 95 (stating that EPA's laboratory audit
program comprised only one
full-time position in 1983).
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the authority to allow "emergency" use of pesticides and additional
uses beyond those approved if a "special local need" authorized by the
states is present.9 Since 1978, EPA and the states have issued over
4000 "emergency" exemptions from the reregistration process and,
through the end of 1982, 8650 "special local need" registrations.'00
Even with this built-in flexibility to lobbying pressure, the Reagan
administration was under intense lobbying pressure from pesticide
manufacturers, resulting in the pesticide registration program becoming one of the prime targets for regulatory relief.10' Between 1980 and
1983, the pesticide program staff was reduced from 760 to 540 (where
it remained roughly until 1992) and emergency exemptions increased
from 180 in 1978 to 750 in 1982.02 By 1992, only two out of the
0 3
19,000 older pesticides had been reregistered.
Virtually since the day of its passage, FIFRA has been under sustained lobbying pressure from agricultural users and pesticide manufacturers. In 1975, FIFRA was amended to increase agriculture's influence on registration decisions by requiring the administrator to
prepare an "agricultural impact statement" before issuing a notice of
intent to cancel a registration.104 Pressure on the EPA has been
equally intense. Targets have attacked the quality of the agency's pesticide risk data and, aided by the Department of Agriculture, presented grim numbers on the loss in jobs, crop productivity, and international trade that would result from deregistration, confident that
"the near-term costs of regulation are more politically potent that
[sic] hypothetical long-term risks."'0 5 As one commentator concluded:
"As long as the balancing standard, which provides EPA with infinite
discretion, is applied, industry has felt confident that it could influence regulatory outcomes."'0 6
FIFRA §§ 18, 24(c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 p, 136v(c) (2000).
100WARGO, supra note 93, at 97-98.
101See id. at 98-99 (describing how the pesticide registration program was targeted
by Vice President Bush's Regulatory Relief Task Force).
102 Id. at 98.
103 Id. at 100.
104 See Act of Nov. 28, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, § 1,
89 Stat. 751, 752 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (2000)) ("[T]he Administrator shall provide the Secretary of Agriculture with a copy of such notice and an analysis of such impact on the
agricultural economy.").
105 WARGO, supra note
93, at 127.
106 Id.
The recently enacted Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
adopted a
health-based benefits standard-"a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue"-for threshold levels (tolerances) of pesticide residues on food. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 21 U.S.C.
99
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More recent (though also more tentative) confirmation for the
model's predicted complementarity between substantive cost-benefit
statutes and lobbying is provided by the 1996 amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)."°7 As amended, the SDWA is a kind of
statutory hybrid.' 8 It instructs EPA to set maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for contaminants in drinking water at levels that are as
close "as is feasible" to levels at which "no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety." 1°9 In this, the SDWA would appear to be what
I have termed a benefits statute. The statute, however, goes on to define "feasible" to mean "feasible with the use of the best technology,
treatment techniques and other means which the Administrator finds,
after examination for efficacy under field conditions and not solely
under laboratory conditions, are available (taking cost into consideration).""0 Moreover, not only is "feasible" defined to require the regulator to take cost into consideration, but the statute also specifically
requires that the maximum feasible contaminant level may not be required if the agency determines that the quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits of that level "would not justify the costs of complying
with the level.""' This is the language of a substantive cost-benefit
statute.' I
It was under this final provision that the Bush administration justified the withdrawal of arsenic maximum contaminant levels promul-

§ 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1999). Although not a cost-benefit standard, the new
health-based standard in fact represented a relative victory for the pesticide industry,
which was facing the threat that EPA would actually begin to enforce (under court order) the "zero tolerance" standard for carcinogenic residues under the so-called Delaney Clause. SeeJames Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens Were in the Right Places: The
Passage of the Food Quality ProtectionAct of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 336-39 (1998)
("The lack of a bright-line [zero-tolerance] standard in the statute was a solid win for
the industry, which had always favored a discretionary, narrative standard.").
107 Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-25 (Supp. V 1999).
108 For a similar view of the amended SDWA, see
SUNSTEIN, ARITHMETIC OF
ARSENIC, supra note 12, at 14 ("The SDWA is an intriguing hybrid, combining an
analysis of public health and feasibility with reference to [cost-benefit analysis] as
well.").
109 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b) (4) (A)
(Supp. V 1999).
110 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b) (5)
(1994).
1 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b) (6) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
112 Compare this with the very similar language from
section 701a of the Flood
Control Act of 1936. See 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1994) (stating that the federal government
should fund flood control improvements "if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs").
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gated in the latter days of the Clinton administration." 3 Public reaction to these steps was furious, as was reaction to the subsequent decision to finalize the rule. ' 14 For purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant
whether the intensity of the public reaction to the arsenic rule or
some other factor accounted for its ultimate finalization."' What is
important about the recent arsenic controversy is that it displays vividly what has always been true of the SDWA: intense lobbying by highcost regulatory targets. The passage of the 1996 amendments marked
the culmination of a furious campaign by certain clearly identified industrial and municipal regulatory targets to prevent tougher standards
for arsenic and other contaminants. ' 6 These targets succeeded in
adding a substantive cost-benefit requirement to the statute, and they
have continued to lobby against tougher standards by publicizing the
exceptionally high costs of meeting anticipated new standards. According to the target groups, because the costs of compliance are so
high, the new standards cannot be met by local water suppliers without substantial federal subsidies. Since the passage of the SDWA, EPA
has examined (via two surveys) the costs of complying with the SDWA
(for example, improving systems to better protect water from microbiological contamination). They are now estimated to run over $31
billion,"' but regulatory targets, such as the Association of Metropoli-

See 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134, 16,135 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
141) (suspending implementation of the arsenic rule until May 22, 2001); see also National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,580, 20,581-82 (proposed
Apr. 23, 2001) (setting out process by which rule would be reviewed).
"14 See SUNSTEIN, ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC, supra note
12, at 7-10, for a discussion
of controversy surrounding the Bush administration's decision to suspend the arsenic
rule.
r 5 My own view, which I cannot elaborate
here, is that the key to understanding
13

the arsenic controversy is not the way the public reacted to the idea of arsenic-a
widely perceived poison-in drinking water, but rather the fact that the costs of the
tougher arsenic standard are concentrated regionally, falling primarily in particular
cities and towns in Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Montana. Because the arsenic
rule cost most Americans nothing, while marginally deterring economic growth in only
a few states, it was a political winner. SeeJohnston, Democracy, Distribution and Development: A New Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Federalization (Jan. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But see SUNSTEIN, ARITHMETIC OF
ARSENIC, supra note 12, at 8 (arguing that the arsenic controversy occurred because
arsenic, a well-known poison, was involved).
116 See MARK R. POWELL, THE 1991 LEAD/COPPER DRINKING
WATER RULE AND THE
1995 DECISION NOT TO REvISE THE ARSENIC DRINKING WATER RULE: TWO CASE
STUDIES IN EPA'S USE OF SCIENCE 34-35 (Res. for the Future Discussion Paper No. 9705, Mar. 1997).
117 Meredith Preston, Drinking Water: EPA Estimates Inftastructure
Needs Will Cost
$150 Billion over Next 20 Years, 32 ENV'T REP. 443, 443 (2001).
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tan Water Agencies, have declared that EPA's numbers are a gross
underestimate, representing only one-third of the total cost of water
infrastructure costs facing the 55,000 water suppliers nationwide."" A
coalition of public water utilities, waste-water treatment facilities, municipal organizations, and engineers (the "Watei Infrastructure Network") has asked Congress to authorize $57 billion in grants over the
next five years for infrastructure improvements. 1 9
My formal model does not attempt to incorporate lobbying by
regulatory targets to persuade the government into paying their compliance costs. Interestingly, this is precisely what FIFRA provides pesticide manufacturers whose registrations are not renewed, 20 and it is
what public water suppliers targeted by the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments currently seek. Albeit indirectly, the formal model developed here does in fact predict such a pattern. The model demonstrates how the adoption of a substantive cost-benefit statute puts low
compliance cost targets at risk. Rationally anticipating that they are
relatively disadvantaged at the judicial review stage under such a statute, regulatory targets have an enhanced incentive not only to lobby
against regulation once the cost-benefit statute is adopted, but also to
lobby for indemnification of their costs both in the text of the law
and, failing there, after the law is passed.
B.

The Structure and Interpretationof Benefits Statutes

In the landscape of federal regulatory statutes, cost-benefit statutes
are the exception; most federal regulatory statutes are benefits statutes. Yet, as noted in the Introduction, benefits statutes, as interpreted by the courts, permit the implementing agency to consider
compliance costs unless the statute clearly forbids any consideration
of costs.
A reasonably careful reading of these statutes confirms the
interpretive soundness of the judicially-fashioned default rule allowing
agencies to consider compliance costs. This Section explains why the
default is also correct from a positive political point of view. It also
uses the formal model to explain why Congress would have crafted
benefits statutes in ways that rationally anticipate and encourage, but

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Section 15 of FIFRA provides for the indemnification of pesticide dealers and

others harmed by a deregistration decision. 7 U.S.C. § 136m (2000).
121 See supra note 34 (interpreting caselaw to conclude that an agency
may consider costs unless statutory language clearly precludes such consideration).
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do not require, regulators to consider compliance costs during the
lobbying stage.
On my model, the crucial distinction between benefits and costbenefit statutes from a congressional point of view is that, under a
benefits statute, an agency's consideration and balancing of regulatory
costs is not reviewable by the courts. That is, Congress often intends
for judicially unreviewable regulatory consideration of costs. One
might argue that this is simply an artifact of the model; just because I
have presumed a particular structure does not mean that it is the
structure that Congress wanted. The real question is why Congress
might want the agency to have this much unreviewable discretion in
considering costs. Here, I begin an answer to this question by sketching a theory of congressional interests in regulatory legislation.
Before sketching the theory, it is important to summarize briefly
what the courts have said about benefits statutes. In the health and
environmental area, virtually all statutory language pertaining to regulatory standards must be read in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (Ben122
Benzene involved a challenge to the Occupational Safety and
zene).
Health Administration's determination that a level of one part per
million of air was the lowest feasible level of occupational workplace
exposure to benzene that could be achieved. 12 3 In the view of the
Court's majority, the key statutory provisions defined "occupational
safety and health standard" as a set of practices "'reasonably necessary
[or] appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment,"' which
",most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the
best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.' 1 24 In interpreting this language, the Benzene majority's opinion established two baseline meanings. First, "'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free."1 25 Second, a
standard based on a statutory command to ensure "safety" can be justified only if the agency first makes a threshold finding "that signifiand can be eliminated or lessened by a change
cant risks are2 present
6
in practices.'

122 448 U.S. 607 (1980).

Id. at 623-25.
Id. at 639 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b) (5) (1976)).
125 Id. at 642.
126 Id. This understanding (that OSHA's standards set under § 655(b) (5), man123

124

dating that "no employee will suffer material impairment of health," must be shown to
provide a "significant benefit" by eliminating a "significant risk") was reaffirmed by the
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Benzene thus established the interpretive rule that, for health and
environmental regulations implementing a congressional command
to ensure a "safe" environment for withstanding judicial review, the
agency must present evidence that those regulations will do something to reduce a "significant risk" of harm. This rule was applied by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride). 117 In Vinyl Chloride, the court interpreted
language in section 112 of the Clean Air Act requiring the EPA to
provide an "ample margin of safety to protect the public health" in
setting hazardous air pollutant standards. 128 In reaffirming the Benzene
interpretive rule that "'safe' does not mean 'risk-free,' 1 29 the District
of Columbia Circuit clearly stated that under such a "safety"-based
statute, the regulator's determination of an "'acceptable'
risk to
30
health ...must be based solely upon the risk to health.'
The statutory provisions at issue in both the Benzene and Vinyl
Chloride decisions exemplify benefits-type provisions. From the prior
discussion of those decisions, one might conclude that the courts affirmatively have precluded agencies from considering costs under
benefits statutes. That is not in fact the case. Having stated that
"safety" does not mean "no risk," 3' the second part of the majority's
opinion in Vinyl Chloride held that an agency may consider economic
cost and technological feasibility in determining how far to go beyond
mere "safety" to ensure an "ample margin" of safety. 32 Similarly, in
Benzene the Court read a provision of OSHA requiring the regulator to
give "due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and
health standards for particular industries" 33 as requiring the regulator
to find a "significant risk of harm and therefore a probability of significant benefits before establishing a new standard" and to undertake
"some cost-benefit analysis" in deciding which workplace hazards to

Court in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-13
(1981), and continues to be the interpretation followed by lower courts, as in American
DentalAss'n v. Martin,984 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.).
127 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc).
128 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1) (B)
(1982) (amended 1990).
129 Vinyl Chloride,824 F.2d at 1153 (quoting Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642).
130 Id. at 1165 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
131 Id. at
1153.
132 Id. at 1164-65; see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 498 (characterizing
EPA's determination as a two-step process, the second of which considers economic
cost and technological feasibility).
133 OSHA § 6(g), 29 U.S.C.
§ 6 5 5 (g) (1994).
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34

eliminate first.1
Benzene and Vinyl Chloride complicate judicial review of a benefits
statute mandating standards to ensure a "safe" environment. On the
one hand, "safe" does not mean "risk-free." On the other hand, the
agency must consider only health or environmental effects in determining what is minimally "safe." In ensuring "safety" by an "ample
margin," however, the agency must be prepared to show that it has
not gone too far. Any particular standard must be justified on the
ground that it eliminates a "significant" risk of harm, and the agency
must develop a methodology for determining the line between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" risks. In drawing this line, it may consider both technological feasibility and economic cost.
On this reading, while benefits statutes do not impose either a
substantive or procedural cost-benefit requirement, neither do they
preclude the agency from considering costs in setting the final standard. Correctly read, the decision in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns3 does not upset this established understanding. That decision
interpreted language in section 109(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, directing EPA to set national primary ambient air quality standards
(NAAQs) "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate
margin of safety,"'3 6 as absolutely precluding EPA from considering
compliance costs in setting those standards." As the Court indicated,
however, its interpretation of "adequate margin of safety" is limited to
the meaning of that phrase as used in section 109(b) (1), which
authorizes EPA to set NAAQs. Under the Clean Air Act's structure,
setting NAAQs is one thing, but achieving them is another. In section
10(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, Congress delegated to the states the
job of adopting a plan to implement the NAAQs. Section 110(a) (2)
imposes a long list of detailed requirements on such state implementation plans (SIPs), '3' and section 10(a) (3) requires each state to get
EPA's approval for its SIP. 39 From its date of passage, however, the
courts have held that these provisions assign to state environmental
agencies the task of deciding where and how to achieve emissions re-

See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 644.
531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (reaffirming an interpretation
of the Clean Air Act set
forth in Lead IndustriesAss'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and subsequent decisions).
136 Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (1994).
137 Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S.at 464-71.
138 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)
(2)(1994).
139 § 7410(a)
(3).
134
135
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ductions. As the Court reaffirmed in American Trucking Ass'ns.
It would be impossible [for the states] to perform that task intelligently
without considering which abatement technologies are most efficient,
and most economically feasible-which is why we have said that "the
most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and

technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan."14

As the Court noted, a number of provisions in the Clean Air Act
authorize the consideration of regulatory compliance costs, but they
4
are directed to state rather than federal regulators.' ' Thus, unlike the
workplace hazardous air pollutant statutory provisions at issue in Benzene and Vinyl Chloride--where the federal agencies both set basic
health standards and determine how they are to be implementedthe NAAQs at issue in American Trucking Ass'ns are only set, but not implemented, by the federal regulator. They are implemented by the
states, and, under the Court's decision in American Trucking Ass'ns,
only state regulators properly can consider compliance costs.
Thus every one of the benefits statutes I have discussed makes it
quite clear that some regulator (albeit state regulators in the Clean
Air Act scheme) may consider compliance costs when determining
how to implement health or environmental benefits-based standards.
The puzzle is why Congress would permit, but not legally require,
regulatory consideration of compliance costs. The sequential, gametheoretic model developed above suggests several related answers.
First, high-compliance-cost regulatory targets have little risk of actually being regulated under a substantive cost-benefit statute but are
very much at risk under a benefits statute. The benefits statute creates
a very strong incentive for such targets to invest huge amounts of
funds at the lobbying stage, amounts that should dwarf their litigation
expenses. Lobbying is directed at all nonjudicial branches of government: the Executive, the Congress, and the agencies. By incentivizing
regulatory targets to concentrate on the lobbying stage, members of
Congress benefit in a number of ways. Most directly, since the agency
is not charged legally with expert balancing of costs and benefits, costs
as communicated to the agency by members of Congress are of pri-

140

Am. TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S. at 470 (quoting Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.

246, 266 (1976)).
141

See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1) (authorizing the EPA administrator to give states

information on compliance costs); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2) (C) (requiring the Clean Air

Act's scientific review committee to advise the EPA administrator of any adverse economic effects from particular strategies for attainment).
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mary importance. Especially when regulatory compliance costs may
be concentrated geographically-because the industries likely to be
targeted are also concentrated geographically-a legislature based on
geographic representation will be very interested in retaining some
control over the imposition of such costs. Legislators do not want to
have to tell politically dominant constituent industries that they have
given away to the agency their power to forestall costly regulation.
Of course, from the point of view of a politically dominant industry that knows it will be a regulatory target, a cost-benefit statute may
be even better (if the target has high cost and is likely to win at the judicial review stage). When such a regulatory target knows that it will
be targeted, it has every incentive to lobby for a cost-benefit statute.
But the world of health and environmental regulation is one of constant change and uncertainty. An entire new class of risks or harms
may be identified after the passage of legislation, a class unforeseen by
Congress.14' Benefits statutes provide a form of political insurance to
Congress; knowing the incentives for regulatory agencies to expand
constantly the scope of their activities, legislators will rationally prefer

to retain a very strong control right over such future regulatory initia43
tives. 1
It must be emphasized that a future regulatory target would still

12 For example, passage of the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FQPA], reflected vastly enhanced knowledge of the risks that pesticide exposure may pose both to human reproduction and early childhood development. For
more information on the FQPA and the changes it makes in both FIFRA and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Politics by Other Means:

Law, Science and Policy in EPA 'sImplementation of the Food Quality ProtectionAct, 53 ADMIN.

L. REV. 103 (2001); and Smart, supra note 106.
143 My model, and its predicted
congressional preference for benefits statutes, is
similar to the general theory outlined by Terry M. Moe, The Politics of StructuralChoice:
Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER
BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990). As Moe

argues, legislators "value 'particularized' control: they want to be able to intervene
quickly, inexpensively, and in ad hoc ways to protect or advance the interests of particular clients in particular matters." Id. at 140 (citation omitted). The best way for
legislators to obtain such control is to tell agencies to focus on regulatory benefits, but
to tightly constrain the agency by imposing complex procedural requirements that ensure that there will be plenty of time for legislative intervention when (ex ante) regulatory costs to key constituents turn out to be high. It is worth noting that this accountwhich stresses Congress' interest in retaining options to intervene-is distinct from the
idea that legislators like vague legislation and agency delegation because this allows
them to shift the blame for costly regulation to the regulator. For a statement of this
alternative (and complementary) view, see GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN
BuREAucRAcY 76-77 (1991).
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generally be better off under a cost-benefit statute. From Congress's
144
point of view, however, the benefits statute is always to be preferred.
By channeling lobbying by future unforeseen regulatory targets to
Congress, legislators increase both their own control and their own
ability to raise campaign funds. The empirical literature on the effect
of campaign contributions shows that what such contributions buy is
not outcomes, but access. 14 Under a cost-benefit statute-either procedural, such as NEPA, or substantive, such as FIFRA-regulatory targets (in the NEPA case, this means environmentalist cost-bearers) can
cause virtually interminable regulatory delay merely by contesting the
agency's own cost-benefit calculation. Under a benefits statute, the
agency has the discretion to virtually ignore costs, and so targets must
make their case to Congress as well. To make their case effectively,
targets must pony up come campaign time.
C.

OMB Review and the Role of Regulatory Beneficiaries

My model can be used to explicate and evaluate criticisms of OMB
review. 146 To do so, we take the critics' factual allegations as true by
assuming that 0MB review essentially provides a closed forum for
regulatory targets to argue to the Executive that regulatory costs are so
large that no regulation should be formally proposed. Within the
terms of the formal model developed earlier, such a preliminary lobbying stage does not alter the analysis, provided that both the agency
and the target are unconstrained in the effort levels they may expend
in lobbying the Executive at this stage. However, one of the ways that

144 Congress's recent record in cost-benefit
legislating strongly supports this prediction. The cost-benefit bills that have actually become law, such as the Congressional
Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08
(2000)), and the Truth in Regulating Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248,
require agencies to do cost-benefit analysis and to disclose that analysis to Congress,
but are quite explicit in excluding such cost-benefit analysis from the judicial review
stage. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2000) ("No determination, finding, action, or omission
under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.").

145 See,

e.g, Tim Groseclose, An Examinationof the Market for Favors and Votes in Con-

gress, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 320, 328-36 (1996) (examining strategies used for favor trading in passing legislation and developing a model to test for trading of political favors);
James M. Snyder, Jr., On Buying Legislatures, 3 ECON. & POL. 93, 99 (1991) (arguing
that contributions have a negligible impact on election outcomes); Gregory Wawro, A
PanelProbitAnalysis of Campaign Contributionsand Roll-Call Votes, 45 AM. J. POL. Sc. 563,

576 (2001) (finding that campaign contributions do not "consistently affect the behavior of members of Congress on votes that those interests deem important").
146 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (providing criticisms of
OMB review and proposals to reform it).
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my formal model simplifies things is by assuming away lobbying by
regulatory beneficiaries. In fact, in many regulatory fields, lobbying
by regulatory beneficiaries is very significant in determining the
agency's political penalty function DO; beneficiary lobbying is often
much more important than lobbying by the agency itself. This admittedly unrealistic assumption does not matter for the earlier analysis,
but it does matter for the analysis of OMB review.
The essence of the criticism of closed OMB review is that it gives
regulatory targets an opportunity to lobby at a stage where regulatory
beneficiaries cannot be heard.147 Formally, this amounts to saying
that, at the OMB review stage, regulatory beneficiaries are constrained
to a lobbying effort level of zero while the regulatory target is allowed
to choose its lobbying effort level optimally. Under my maintained assumption about the lobbying game (as summarized in the penalty
function DO), this means that lobbying by regulatory targets at the
OMB review stage is likely to be very productive, in the sense that the
target may not need to invest very much to generate a large political
penalty (by imposing a lot of political pressure on the agency to drop
the regulation). Unlike congressional opponents, who will typically
impose a penalty on the agency only if it goes ahead and finalizes the
regulation, the President is likely to penalize the agency simply for
proceeding to formally propose a regulation. The reason is that regulatory targets who take advantage of the opportunity to lobby at the
OMB review stage have thereby revealed that they view even a proposed regulation as a potentially costly matter. To the extent that the
President, through OMB, is sympathetic to the arguments made by
such targets at the OMB review stage, the President is likely to penalize the agency for proceeding ahead with a regulatory game that the
target has already credibly signaled will be very costly for it.
Thus the OMB review stage gives regulatory targets the opportunity to impose a potentially large political penalty on the agency at a
relatively low cost. Because this penalty attaches even as soon as the
agency decides to formally propose a regulation, it reduces the
agency's perceived net benefit from regulating all the way through the

147SeeMorrison, supra note 21, at 1068 ("[B]ecause this
process operates in secret,
there is no way for the public, the Congress, or the courts to know precisely what OMB
has done and what the real basis is for decisions issued under the nominal signature of
the agency head."); see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 19 ("Many people alleged that private communications had occurred and that [the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, an institution within the OMB] was basing its decisions on
pressure from business groups with self-interested stakes in the outcome.").
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regulatory game. The agency will devote less effort to lobbying for,
and litigating to uphold, its regulation. On the margin, the preliminary OMB review stage will clearly reduce the volume of both proposed and finalized regulation.
By the same logic, requiring that OMB review be opened up so
that regulatory beneficiaries can also participate fully at that stage
would probably weaken significantly the impact of OMB review of
agency behavior, but probably not by as much as its proponents believe. Regulatory beneficiaries who rationally understand the regulation game would indeed seize the opportunity to lobby the Executive
to lessen the political cost to the relevant agency of proposing a regulation they favor. Especially when Congress and the Executive are
controlled by different parties, the executive branch political penalty
function is likely to be very different than the congressional political
penalty function. When the Executive is committed to a general program of deregulation, for instance, regulatory beneficiaries may be
relatively ineffective in persuading the Executive to allow any particular regulation to go forward. Notably, as an historical matter, OMB
review has been active and important in curtailing the volume of regulation under Republican presidents while either actively opposed or
neglected by Democratic presidents."8 It is unlikely that procedural
changes making the OMB review process more open to regulatory
beneficiaries would either change this overall partisan pattern or
148 During the Carter administration, the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (an

interagency committee directed primarily by the President's Council of Economic Advisors) conducted cost-benefit analyses of regulations and had substantial impact on
regulatory policy. See EDWARD PAUL FUCHS, PRESIDENTS, MANAGEMENT AND
REGULATION 53-57 (1988) (stating the Regulator Analysis Review Group's goal of making "certain the costs of each proposed [OMB] rule had been fully considered so that
the least costly means might be identified"). However, this committee's role prompted
a strong reaction by the targeted regulatory agencies, who succeeded in taking back
much of the authority for regulatory review through the Regulatory Council. This, in
turn, prompted an increasingly antiregulation 96th Congress to propose legislation
requiring agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis and requiring the President to certify that any new regulatory costs would be offset by the reduction of some other regulatory burden. Id. at 70-78. Through Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), the
Reagan administration made OMB regulatory cost-benefit analysis a cornerstone of
Republican presidential regulatory policy. As Hahn, Cavanagh, and Stavins succinctly
put it, during the Clinton administration, economic analysis "had to fight harder for its
place at the table" in EPA regulatory proceedings. CAVANAGH ET AL., supra note 56, at
9. When it was employed, economic analysis was used not for cost-benefit analysis but
to identify cost effective regulatory alternatives. For a case study, see Albert L. Nichols,
Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997). OMB played a very limited role in regulatory review during the Clinton administration. See Dudley & Antonelli, supra note 19.
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make OMB review significantly less effective in Republican administrations.
D. PoliticalPartiesand the Centralizationof Regulatory Review
In a world in which political party affiliation does not constrain
the positions taken by federal legislators, those legislators are free to
serve local constituent interests. When it comes to overseeing the activities of federal regulatory agencies, one would expect that federal
legislators are quick to intervene to stop or weaken regulations that
would impose large costs on important constituents. Industries that
are very important sources of jobs and taxes in a particular state or
legislative district should expect to see their senators and representative actively working to prevent regulators from imposing large costs
on them. In other words, because Congress is based on a geographic
principle of representation, regulators will face a potentially large political penalty (the formal Do function set out in Part I) when they
impose regulatory costs on industries or other regulatory targets that
are important to particular, identifiable local economies. Regulatory
agencies that seek to maximize net regulatory benefits will tend to eschew such targets, and to prefer to regulate targets who can shift and
spread the cost of regulation over a large, geographically diffuse
population. The paradigmatic target of this sort is an oligopolistic industry with relatively diffuse nationwide operations. Even though the
industry may have great national economic significance, because its
operations are diffuse, it is unlikely to be a key constituent in any state
or legislative district. For this reason, its marginal productivity in lobbying before Congress is likely to be very low.
It is the Executive, and not Congress, that provides the natural
place for such an industry to direct its lobbying efforts. Only the
President wages a national electoral campaign, and even if an employer is nowhere a local mainstay, if it has a significant national presence, then a presidential candidate will court its employees' votes
when no senator or representative would. There are, moreover, likely
to be economies of scale in political campaign contributions. Rather
than spreading its contribution across a number of potentially key
Senators and Representatives-with no assurance that even the most
influential legislator will succeed in deflecting regulation-a national
regulatory target can concentrate its contribution on the officeholder
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with actual constitutional authority over regulatory management.
Like the earlier, more formal analysis, this argument assumes away
the influence of political parties. By the late 1980s, the decline of
American political parties was being blamed for a variety of ills allegedly besetting the American political system' 50 In recent years, however, parties have reemerged as potent political institutions, with party
leaders in the House and Senate exercising a high degree of control
over the legislative agenda and the composition and leadership of key
Both major parties have taken
committees, such as appropriations.
up federal health, safety and environmental regulation as a defining
or "name brand" issue. Their enhanced role modifies some of the
conclusions that I have reached about how the regulatory game is
played.
Party affiliation acts as a label or political brand name-a commitment to support certain political positions. 52 The commitment is
made credible by the financial strength of the party, its ability to sponsor and financially support its own candidate if a particular legislator
deviates from the party line. This is not to say that the party insists
upon mindless uniformity. To the extent that there are local variations in voter preferences, it is in the party's interest to tolerate some
deviation from the party line to enable its candidates to win. There
are, however, limits. Too much deviation by too many candidates significantly dilutes the party brand name.
National political parties generate both efficiencies and inefficiencies. By making a particular legislator's commitment to a party

149

For a related analysis, see James C. Miller III et al., A Note on Centralized Regula-

tory Review, 43 PUB. CHOICE 83 (1984).
150 See, e.g., MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF' AMERICAN POLITICAL

PARTIES, 1952-1992, at 132 (enlarged ed. 1994) (blaming decline of parties for the absence of issue debates and predominance of personal mud-slinging in the 1988 presidential campaign).
151 See COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 49, at 2 (describing parties in the House of
Representatives as "species of 'legislative cartel'"). Strong evidence for the dominant
influence of party affiliation over congressional voting on certain issues is provided by
James M. Snyder, Jr. & Tim Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence in CongressionalRollCall Voting, 44 AM.J. POL. SCI. 193 (2000).
152 This model of party affiliation as a credible signal of a legislator's voting behavior is attributable to Mathew D. McCubbins, Party Governance and US. Budget Deficits:
Divided Government and Fiscal Stalemate, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES 83

(Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner eds., 1991); and James M. Snyder, Jr., Safe Seats,
Marginal Seats, and Party Platforms: The Logic of Platform Differentiation, 6 ECON. & POL.
201 (1994). The model of parties as producers of political brand names has recently
been formalized by James M. Snyder, Jr. and Michael M. Ting in An InformationalRationalefor PoliticalParties,46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 90 (2002).
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position credible, political parties increase the amount of information
that is available to voters. Voters do not need to discount candidate
commitments that have been made credible by the national party's
sanctioning apparatus. Voters have more information about what
candidates will do if elected, and once in office, parties ameliorate the
principal-agent problem that confronts voters who wish to ensure that
the candidate does what she promised to do.
For this very same reason, parties inevitably weaken the ability of
legislators to faithfully represent constituent preferences over policy
outcomes. Party interest in, and control over, general regulatory programs constrains the ability of individual legislators to effectively represent constituent preferences in conducting regulatory oversight.
For instance, even if every single constituent would enjoy a large net
benefit from a particular regulation, when the legislator's party opposes the regulation, the legislator may face party pressure to inefficiently (from the point of view of her district) oppose the regulation.
Party influences thus alter the regulation game model developed
above by making individual legislators less responsive to the district or
state-specific costs and benefits of a particular regulation. Rather,
there is a tendency for parties to group regulations into categoriessome favored, some disfavored-and then enforce uniform support or
opposition among members for all proposals within the category. Issues such as regulatory reform are not ideological in some metaphysical sense; rather, ideological issues are those which are packaged together so as to create party brand names. By selling a uniform
position on an issue package, the party generates economies for interest groups. Rather than incurring the potentially very high transaction costs of discerning where particular Republicans stand on particular regulatory programs, regulatory cost bearers can simply make
their case to party leaders, who can promise a particular legislative result that does not depend upon constituent preferences. Similarly,
regulatory beneficiaries can turn to Democratic party leaders, who are
able credibly to promise action that may well override the constituent
interests of many Democratic legislators.
The political polarization of environmental regulatory issues has
occurred not only at the legislative level... but at the executive level as
well. Even a generally environmentally unconcerned President such
as Clinton was pushed by his party to support a variety of environ-

153William Lowry & Charles Shipan, Environmental Policy and Party Divergence
in
Congress,54 POL. RES. Q. 245 (2001).
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mental regulatory initiatives, just as Republicans slowed Bush's relatively activist EPA regulatory agenda by pushing for the creation of the
White House Council on Competitiveness. The political polarization
of environmental regulation has altered the regulatory review process.
Republican congressional leaders are attuned to all types of environmental regulatory costs, even those that can be effectively shifted and
spread and that do not translate into political costs for individual legislators. Democratic party leaders advocate the benefits of environmental regulation. Party brand identification is not everything: regionally concentrated regulatory costs-such as those entailed by the
EPA's recent move to reduce emissions by midwestern and southern
coalburning electric power plants-still provoke opposition from legislators of both parties who represent cost-bearing districts and states.
Still, the Democratic party's brand identification with federal environmental regulation has led to a reversal in the regulatory review
process. As observed earlier, in the Clinton administration, 0MB
regulatory review of regulatory costs was significantly shortened; indeed, by executive order, the environmental impacts of proposed
regulations were to be given as much weight in regulatory review as
were economic impacts. 54 Under President Clinton, regulatory review-that is, cost-benefit analysis-within the EPA was downplayed
dramatically as the agency increasingly became a benefits advocate
rather than a cost-benefit balancer. 5 5 Democratically controlled
Congresses pressured Reagan- and Bush-era federal environmental
regulators to take action. By contrast, since the 104th Congress, Republican legislative leaders have both attempted to rewrite particular
regulatory statutes to require cost-benefit-based standards, '5 6 and, failing that, have succeeded in requiring regulatory agencies to do costbenefit
'57 analysis of "major" rules and to disclose that analysis to Congress. The Republican party has become identified with regulatory
reform and has aligned itself as a party with the issues and concerns of
regulatory targets. The political party "brand-naming" of health, envi154

See supra note 19 (noting that President Clinton's Executive Order 12,866

stated that "agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental and public health-safety").
See CAVANAGH ET AL., supra note 56, at 9 ("[Wjhen [economics] did have a
place at the table, economic analysis was more likely to be focused on increasing the
cost-effectiveness of regulations than on weighing benefits against costs." (citation
omitted)).
IM See supra note 7 (listing congressional attempts to require regulatory standards
to be ustified by cost-benefit analysis).
]A See supra note 6 (listing statutes that require such a procedure).
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ronmental, and safety regulation has changed the congressional political penalty function. Most importantly, the national or aggregate
regulatory cost borne by a target is now much more significant in determining the congressional political penalty that the target can inflict. When regulation was not a core political party issue, even a nationally significant target might have a hard time garnering
congressional intervention and support. In particular, targets that
were capable of passing on most of the costs of regulation to a geographically diffuse group such as consumers, or whose operations
were widespread geographically-so that the target was not a really
significant employer or taxpayer in any locality-often had a difficult
time getting congressional leaders to intervene to lobby against proposed regulation. Now, however, through national political parties
and their fundraising capabilities, a nationally significant regulatory
target group can exert influence even on legislators in whose districts
or states the target has no presence. Recent federal legislation requiring cost-benefit analysis for "major" regulations confirms this prediction. Because "major" regulations are defined by reference to their
aggregate cost (of $100 million or more), such legislation benefits
only those regulatory targets who operate in fairly large, nationally
significant industrial sectors or whose own operations are of similar
significance standing alone.
Another effect of political parties is less intuitive. By making opposition to environmental regulation an ideological, party-level issue,
the Republican leadership lowered the marginal political cost of politically difficult regulatory programs. Regulating the mining industry-which is a significant employer in certain clearly identifiable districts and states-has not become appreciably more costly by the
advent of a Republican Congress. But regulating local land use and
development through federal wetlands and endangered species programs has become much more costly. Thus the marginalpolitical cost
to federal regulators of traditionally politically tough regulation has
actually decreased as a consequence of partisan ideologizing of environmental regulation.
CONCLUSION: SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES ON COST-BENEFIT STATUTES
AND REGULATORY REFORM

By examining how statutory structure and other institutional interactions (such as OMB review) affect an agency's incentives to investigate and balance regulatory costs and benefits, my focus has been
primarily positive or predictive. The many non-intuitive predictions
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about agency incentives to consider both costs and benefits that
emerge from my sequential, game theoretic model of the regulatory
process are only a sample of the sort of behavioral hypotheses that
such a modeling approach may generate. One can use the model to
explore a wide range of additional issues in administrative law, such as
the choice among alternative standards for substantive judicial review
of agency rulemaking and the legislative veto.
My purpose in this Article has not been to fashion and defend detailed normative regulatory critique and proposals for reform, but the
model developed above does have some general normative implications that are worth highlighting by way of conclusion. One of the
model's most important normative implications is that legally requiring agencies to set standards according to substantive cost-benefit tests
is unlikely to produce the sort of dramatic changes in actual regulatory behavior that some may hope. As an historical matter, this should
not be overly surprising. After all, the Flood Control Act of 1936-that
paradigmatic instance of a substantive cost-benefit statute-is precisely
the statute under which the Army Corps of Engineers conducted its
twentieth-century construction boom. The Corps has always been able
to find economic benefits (typically highly speculative future recreational benefits) thatjustify the costs its projects have imposed. 5 8 The
game theoretic approach developed above, however, clearly identifies
the general underlying cause of the relative failure of the Flood Control Act of 1936 to discipline agency behavior. It thus provides insight
into when, if ever, a substantive cost-benefit statute might do a better
job of changing agency behavior.
The underlying source of the Corps' power under the Flood Control Act of 1936 is not, my model suggests, so much the fact that
Corps' projects are congressionally beloved pork, but rather the costs
and benefits of those projects are not judicially verifiable. If courts actually observed true project costs and benefits, then the (credible)
threat of judicial review under an express statutory cost-benefit edict
could be a powerful deterrent to inefficient projects. On my model,
the lobbying game determines Corps behavior precisely because courts
have so little information about project costs and benefits and judicial
review is (for this and other statutory reasons) so inefficacious.

158

Sadly, this remains true today. See Michael Grunwald, Engineers of Power: Inside

the Army Corps (pts. 1-5), WASH. POST, Sept. 10-14, 2000 (describing the questionable
cost-benefit analysis the Army Corps frequently undergoes in various projects and arguing that the integrity of such analysis is often undermined by the desire of the Corps to
increase their budget because it receives project per project).
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The same underlying strategic problem-limited observability of
regulatory cost and benefit variables-may severely limit the effectiveness of substantive cost-benefit statutes as tools of regulatory reform in
other areas of the law as well. Consider, for instance, federal environmental regulation of air and water pollution. The greatest perceived inefficiency of federal regulation in these areas may be EPA's
strong tendency to prefer technology-based pollution control standards: to base the required level of pollution reduction on what can
technologically be done, rather than what is efficient in cost-benefit
terms for a particular kind of factory in a particular place. But the
choice of this particular regulatory instrument-technology-based
standards-is, on my model, a virtual strategic inevitability. Suppose
that federal environmental regulators had simply adopted total permissible pollution loads on a watershed by watershed basis, allocated
watershed-wide permits, and then allowed polluters in the watershed
to take whatever steps they wanted to comply, including trading the
permits to each other for dollars. Under this strategy, federal regulators would have conceded all strategic advantages to the regulated
community. Under a benefits-based statute, the regulator would have
needed to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking before adopting any particular pollution load for the watershed. The load would
have to have been justified on the basis of its benefits in improving watershed quality. But this is a scientific question, and regulators enjoyed (in the early stages at least) no particular advantage over industry with respect to scientific knowledge of the effects of reduced loads
of various pollutants on environmental quality. On the benefits side,
regulators would have faced a high probability of failure on judicial
review.
Even worse from a regulator's strategic point of view, regulatory
targets would surely have made the argument to both the executive
and legislative branches that the load reductions were impossible to
achieve without massive decreases in industry output, decreases that
would cost jobs and thereby inflict large localized harms. Regulators
would have been at an extreme informational disadvantage in trying
to rebut these claims. On the cost side, regulators would have been at
a huge disadvantage in the ex ante regulatory lobbying game.
Consider now the alternative regulatory strategy of technologyforcing, requiring that particular industries adopt particular pollution
abatement technologies. Typically developed with funding from environmental agencies themselves, the agency gains knowledge of these
technologies before regulatory targets. Moreover, by directing re-
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search into technologies that are add-ons to existing production processes-end of the pipe waste reductions (or more realistically, transformations)-rather than requiring modifications in production processes to reduce the amount of waste generated, the agency deprives
regulated industry of its natural informational advantage with respect
to its ability to modify production processes. In order to gain a strategic advantage in implementing the benefits statute, the agency may
even require inefficient or ineffective abatement technologies. There
may be a whole universe of ways to reduce pollution and improve environmental quality more cheaply and effectively, but there is no incentive for the agency to allow regulated entities the discretion to
adopt such measures.
This roughly describes the sorry state of media-specific, technology-based federal environmental regulation today. It might seem, and
has seemed to many in Congress, that the solution is to require environmental agencies to do detailed analyses of the costs as well as the
benefits of their proposed regulations: l59 one might call this NEPA inverted. When instrument choice is endogenous, agency behavior under the cost-benefit statute may be rather different than what costbenefits advocates expect. Under a cost-benefit approach, the agency
will have an even stronger incentive to propose compliance strategies
that lessen its informational disadvantage than under a benefits statute. NEPA transformed federal project agency behavior by forcing
the agencies to publicize the collective environmental costs of projects
that delivered concentrated benefits. The costs of environmental
regulations, by contrast, are generally concentrated in a few areas and
therefore already well-communicated through the lobbying process.
Even when the costs are diffuse-partly borne by consumers, and
partly by shareholders-the costs are, if anything, better known to
regulated entities than to the regulator. The need to survive judicial
scrutiny under a cost-benefit statute may well incentivize federal environmental agencies to tinker with existing abatement technologies
whose costs and benefits are well understood rather than to propose
novel and potentially more effective, but also more uncertain and potentially more costly, approaches.

159 This is evidenced by the attempt to enact the Comprehensive Regulatory Re-

form Act of 1995, the successful enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, and other legislation discussed supra note 5.
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APPENDIX: ANALYrICS OF THE REGULATION GAME

I.

THE REGULATION GAME

This Appendix formally describes the model underlying the analysis in the text, and provides proofs for the less straightforward claims I
have made there.
A. GeneralFeatures
1. The Regulator
For the risk-neutral case that forms the baseline for my analysis,
the regulator's objective is:
MaxMx0,e.,o
[0, mT'e.))[1-- r(L, L,, B/B)] (B- D(e, e)-

-U,

(1)

where the objective reflects the assumption that the regulator has the
option of not regulating and getting the reservation payoff of 0. The
variables in problem (1) are defined as follows:
B = regulator's gross utility from a particular regulation; assumed
initially to be common knowledge to the regulator and the firm;
B = level of benefits required to regulate under the statute;
D(e, e) = decrease in regulator's utility brought about by lobbying
Congress and/or the executive branch with D 1 < 0, D 2 > 0, D,1 > 0,

D22 < 0. (Cross partials are discussed in the analysis below.) This function is throughout assumed to be common knowledge to the regulator
and the firm;
e., e = lobbying effort levels of the agency and firm, respectively;
r (L, L, B/B) = probability that a promulgated regulation is va-

cated on judicial review under a benefits statute, with r, < 0, r2 > 0,
r3 < 0, r, > 0, r,, < 0 and r, > 0. I also assume that r,, < 0, and r,, < 0that is, the higher is the ratio of the agency's perceived benefit to the
level required by the statute, the bigger (smaller) is the marginal productivity of agency (firm) litigation effort. This function varies with
the form of the statutory command-benefits, substantive cost-benefit,
procedural cost-benefit. The version given here is for the benefits
statute (versions for the latter two statutory regimes are defined in the
later analysis). My analysis of the benefits statute does not focus on
the level of required benefits, and so in the analysis I simply write the
benefits function as r(L, Lf); and
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L, Lf = litigation efforts of the agency and firm, respectively.
Lobbying and litigation efforts are both assumed to be perfectly
observable when incurred.
The function D(e, e) gives the equilibrium penalty inflicted by political opponents of the regulation, and is itself the result of current
and future actions by Congress and the Executive. I do not model the
process by which such sanctions are determined, and so in this sense
Do is a reduced form specification.
2.

The Regulated Firm

I assume throughout that the regulated entity is a risk-neutral firm
with the objective:
Min ce,
min [(1- r(L, Lf))q + e + Lf]l,

(2)

where the firm's objective reflects the fact that it can choose to refrain
from either lobbying or litigating against regulation and simply comply, incurring the compliance cost c, for i = 1, h with c, > B > c, The
firm knows its compliance cost. The regulator has incomplete information regarding the firm's compliance cost, with prior probabilities
A (0 < p < 0) and Ph = 1 - p that the firm has, respectively, low versus
high compliance cost.
3.

The Sequential Structure

The key choice variables in the regulation game-the level of lobbying effort ei and the level of litigation effort L,-are not chosen simultaneously. Rather they are sequentially chosen at different stage
of the regulation game. That game has the following stages:
1. The regulator chooses between regulating and not regulating,
and, if it decides to regulate simultaneously, chooses a level of investment in assessing the economic costs of regulation. The level of investment in learning the firm's compliance cost can take one of two
values: I = 0, in which case the regulator gains no additional knowledge beyond its priors given above, and I > 0, in which case the regulator perfectly observes firm compliance cost. Once proposed, the
regulation cannot be modified in response to actions taken at later
stages of the game.
2. If the regulator chooses to regulate and drafts a regulation,
then it must provide public notice of the proposed regulation. Whatever is contained in the public notice is assumed to become common
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knowledge. After public notice is given, the firm chooses between
complying with the regulation and initiating a political contest over
the regulation. In this contest, the regulated firm chooses an effort
level e making an argument to the regulator, Congress and/or the
Executive, that the regulation is too costly, both to the firm and to the
communities in which it operates, and ought not to be finalized. The
agency expends an effort level e.in an attempt to offset the firm's arguments and persuade both Congress and the Executive that the regulation generates positive net benefits for the society. These effort levels are determined simultaneously by the agency and firm.
3. After the agency and firm have made their contest expenditures, the agency must decide whether to finalize, or drop, the regulation. If and only if the regulation is finalized, then the agency's perceived benefit from the regulation is decreased by an amount D(e., e)
specified above. The notion here is that insofar as the firm is successful, it persuades members of Congress or the Executive to take present
and future actions that effectively lower the agency's utility from finalizing the regulation. For reasons that will become clear in the next
Section, the assumption that the sanction D is committed to and cannot be withdrawn based on the outcome of any subsequent legal challenge is important.
4. If the regulation is finalized, then the firm has the option of
challenging the regulation in court (seeking judicial review) or complying. If the firm challenges the regulation in the courts, then the
firm and agency simultaneously choose their judicial review litigation
effort levels Lf and L. respectively. As is known from the more general
economic theory of litigation and conflict, equilibrium levels of litigation expenditures depend upon the cross partials r . for i, j = 1, 2, 3.
Both cases, substitutes and complements, will be considered below.
When the court vacates the regulation, the agency gets 0 benefit from
the regulation and the firm does not comply. When the regulation is
upheld, the firm complies immediately. (Although I rule out noncompliance with a judicially upheld regulation, as I explain below,
noncompliance is in many ways functionally similar to the legal challenge choice that I do explicitly model).
Figure 1 from the text depicts the extensive form of the game just
described.
4.

Solution Concept and Method

In identifying equilibria in the regulation game just outlined, I restrict attention to Bayesian Perfect equilibria ("BPE"). This concept
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isolates strategies that are individually payoff maximizing given rational revision according to Bayes' Rule of a player's knowledge about
the opponent's type (high or low cost of compliance firm, for instance). It also requires that at any given stage of the game, moves are
payoff maximizing. The strategic-perfection requirement eliminates
incredible threats by requiring that any action taken be optimal for
the stage of the game at which it is taken. The game breaks down into
two parts: the final litigation, judicial review stage, and the earlier
lobbying stage. Equilibria are obtained working by backward induction from the final stage
B. Analysis: EquilibriumBehavior Under a Benefits Statute

I assume that under a benefits statute, the agency's regulation is
upheld provided that the court finds that the regulation is rationally
related to the statutory goal of reducing "significant" risks to the environment or health and safety. The analysis proceeds first by assuming that the agency cannot learn the firm's compliance cost.
1. Equilibria in the Final, Legal Challenge Stage
We work by backward induction from the final, judicial review
stage of the game. The decision whether or not to bring a legal challenge is made by the firm, which possesses complete information. The
firm's decision whether or not to bring such a challenge may or may
not inform that agency as to the firm's actual cost of compliance (high
or low). The first result is immediate.
Proposition 1. The firm's litigation effort increasesin compliance cost c,
while the agency's litigation effort falls in the size of the political sanction D.
For sufficiently low compliance cost, the firm will comply rather than bring a
legal challenge; similarly, for sufficiently high politicalpenalty, the agency will
drop the regulation (fail to finalize).

Remark. Proposition 1 says that three types of equilibria are possible: 1) an interior solution, in which the agency finalizes the regulation, the firm seeks judicial review, and both the agency and the firm
spend a positive amount on a court battle; 2) a corner solution in
which the firm's cost is so low (relative to the cost of litigation) that it
would rather comply than fight; and 3) a corner solution in which the
lobbying stage has so reduced the agency's net benefit B - D that the
agency is better off simply withdrawing the regulation than finalizing
it and facing costly judicial review.
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Proof. To establish these points, note that the firm's objective in
the final, legal challenge stage is given by:
min [(1 - r(La, Lf))c + LfI,
Lf

(3)

where we recall that rO is the probability that the court vacates the
regulation. The first order condition for problem (3) is given by
r:c = 1, which by the assumed differentiability (and hence continuity)
of rO immediately shows that for sufficiently low c, the corner solution
Lf = 0 will obtain. The implicit function theorem and the assumption
that r22 < 0 establish the monotonicity of firm litigation effort with respect to compliance cost.
Whenever having a high-compliance cost brings the firm a strategic advantage in the litigation game (in a sense made more precise by
the proof of the next proposition), there are only two equlibria at the
stage at which the firm decides whether to litigate: either both a lowand high-cost firm challenge, or only the high-cost firm challenges. In
other words, the only separating equilibrium involves only a high-cost
firm challenging.
The second part of the claim follows from the agency's final stage
objective, which is to:
Max
(B-D)(1- r(L., Lf))- L,
La

(4)

The effect of increasing the sanction on the agency for pursuing a
politically costly regulation bears emphasis. By the monotonicity of
the function L(D) defined implicitly by problem (4)'s first order condition, a sufficiently large sanction on the agency for finalizing an unpopular regulation will deter the agency from mounting any defense
in court. Let this deterrent sanction be denoted by D^(ro, B). That is,
the litigation-conflict function along with the prepolitical benefit to
the agency from the regulation determines how large a sanction is required to kill the agency's incentive to defend the regulation in court.
Note that the earlier assumption that the political sanction is committed to prior to the outcome of litigation is of only marginal significance. Even if the sanction were only carried out when the agency
succeeded in defending against a legal challenge (so the regulation
became final and was not vacated by the court), it would still cut the
agency's expected return from legal conflict and there would still be a
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value of the sanction (albeit larger) such that the agency would not
mount a defense if the regulation were challenged.
Proposition 2. When firm litigation effort reduces the marginal productivity of agency litigation effort, there must exist some level of compliance cost
c,,. such that for any given agency benefit B, the agency will choose the regulatory option that realizes that benefit at cost c = min {c > c_ }.
Proof. To establish the Proposition, note that the slope of the
agency's reaction function is given by dL a / dLf = - r,2 / r,,. By the assumption that r, > 0, dL / dLf > < 0 as r,2 < > 0. Thus if firm litigation
effort reduces the marginal effectiveness of agency litigation effort-in
the precise sense that r,2 > 0-then as the firm's effort increases, the
agency's effort level falls. Since the first order condition for problem
(3) implies that aLf/ac > 0, imposing a very high compliance cost on
the firm-which quite intuitively increases the firm's optimal level of
litigation effort-it may have the perverse effect of lowering the equilibrium level of agency litigation effort and hence also the equilibrium
probability that the regulation is upheld rather than vacated by the
court. That is, whenever r,2 > 0, it will be the case that r(c,) < r(c), so
that the regulation has a better chance of being upheld by the court
when firm compliance cost is low versus high.
It is not necessarily reasonable to think that for all litigation effort
levels r,2 > 0. Since the firm is in the position of a plaintiff attacking
the promulgation process or substance (about this distinction, more
later) of the regulation, the marginal productivity of agency litigation
effort may bear a rather complex stepwise relationship to firm effort
levels. To see this, observe that if the firm does very little other than
file the case, then the first little bit of agency effort brings a large return, with further effort levels having 0 marginal product. If the firm
does a bit more, then agency effort will be increasingly productive
even longer, although marginal productivity still will fall to 0 beyond
some point (after which all the firm's arguments have been addressed
and refuted). In this very plausible model of the interaction effects of
litigation effort, for low levels of firm effort, there is a discontinuity in
the marginal productivity of agency effort. For higher levels of firm
effort, the marginal productivity of low levels of agency effort will fall
even though the marginal productivity of higher levels of effort increases (that is, r,2 < 0 for sufficiently high Lf and L.).
Even under this more plausible construction (that r,2 is not monotone in L.), although high levels of firm effort indeed would increase
the marginal productivity of relatively high levels of agency effort
(above the level of 0 that they would otherwise have), high firm effort
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would so lower the marginal productivity of agency effort at lower levels that the equilibrium agency effort level will fall as firm effort increases. Thus even if we were to allow this more complex interaction
between firm and agency litigation effort levels, it would remain true
that beyond some point, increasing regulatory toughness-the compliance cost c-would induce the firm to expend so much effort in
seeking judicial reversal of the regulation that the agency's probability
of surviving judicial review would fall. Putting aside the intermediate,
political contest stage of the game for the moment, this would imply
that the agency might well be better off choosing a regulatory option
with a lower net benefit to it, but lower compliance cost, because the
expected net benefit to the agency-the benefit discounted by the
probability that the regulation will survive judicial review-will be
higher. In this way, the possibility of judicial review itself forces an
agency to indirectly internalize the cost it imposes on the firm.
This analysis holds regardless of whether or not the agency has
gained precise knowledge of the firm's compliance cost from firm behavior at the earlier, political contest stage of the game. In the case of
imperfect information by the agency, one may simply think of the
agency as choosing between regulatory alternatives with nonoverlapping cost distributions. It remains true that in choosing between these distributions, the agency must take into account the possibility that a higher cost, albeit higher benefit distribution, will provoke the firm to spend more on litigation, which may lower the
agency's expected net return from regulating.
2.

Equilibria in the Lobbying Contest and Promulgation Decision

Because I have assumed away the possibility that the regulation is
modified by the agency as a response to political challenge, the political contest directly affects only the agency's payoff, lowering the net
benefit to the agency by D(e, ef). Under the assumption that D, <0,
agency lobbying directly benefits the agency by decreasing the political penalty and hence increasing the agency's net benefit B - D. For
the firm, by contrast, spending a positive amount on lobbying is valuable only through its indirect effects in either causing the agency to
drop the regulation (the corner solution) or spend less effort in defending it.
As with the final stage, there are a variety of potential equilibria.
The first, the fully interior solution, arises when the agency will finalize regardless of firm lobbying expenditure (because the gross benefit
B is very large relative to the maximum potential penalty D, and the
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other issues in positive political theory besides this one.
A first step would be to analyze, more systematically, the dependence of the equilibria in the benefits and cost-benefit scenarios on the
values of B, D, r, and . What combinations of parameters prompt the
agency to sort between welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing directives in the two scenarios? Johnston's model shows that it is possible
for an agency, operating under a benefits statute, to issue those and
only those regulations that are cost-benefit justified. The model also
demonstrates that it is possible for an agency, operating under a costbenefit statute, to fail thus to distinguish between regulations. But it
would be nice to know whether these results are relatively common or
relatively rare given the possible combinations of model parameters.
Second, it would be interesting to know whether the implications
of Johnston's analysis are robust across relatively small-scale changes
in the model. One change, already suggested, is to model the total
costs of regulation as a sum of compliance costs plus other costs, such
that courts engaged in CBA care about total costs, but firms care only
about compliance costs and have asymmetric information only with
respect to these. Another relatively small-scale change is to vary the
mechanics of the political sanction. The political sanction (D), as currently modeled, is contingent on the agency's finalizing its directive,
but not contingent on the directive being upheld by the court. This is
a plausible representation of how political sanctions work. However,
it is no less plausible to think that sanctions are inflicted noncontingently on agencies that propose regulations costly to firms and no less
plausible to think that sanctions are inflicted only if the regulation is
both finalized and upheld. In other words, the political sanctioning
process plausibly could be cruder than Johnston imagines, or more refined. Political principals lobbied by irate firms might sanction agencies for even proposing costly regulations (perhaps because it is too
costly for the principals to monitor agency behavior, and the practice
of principals is therefore to impose sanctions noncontingently, with
the amount of the sanction dependent on firm and agency lobbying
effort) .3 Alternatively, political principals could sanction agencies
39 Johnston briefly considers and rejects this possibility. As he puts it: "Congress
loses a substantial amount in controlling agency rulemaking if its sanctions are triggered by proposed as well as finalized rulemaking." Johnston, supra note 2, at 1385.
But noncontingent sanctions still could be beneficial to Congress-for example, Congress could use the threat of noncontingent sanctions to deter the initial promulgation
of rules that frustrate congressional preferences or to deter the promulgation of rules
that prompt pre-promulgation lobbying by firms-and it is not obvious that the marginal benefit of contingent sanctions (to Congress) would justify the marginal cost (to
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only for making choices that actually cause an increase in a firm's
compliance costs;judicial invalidation prevents an agency's regulatory
choice from having this causal impact.
It would be interesting to know how effective the benefits and
cost-benefit statutes are in sorting between welfare-increasing
and welfare-decreasing directives, given the small-scale modeling
changes just described. Note that the change in the contingency of
the sanction leads to substantial changes in the parties' incentive
structure and behavior. If the sanction is noncontingent, then-once
the regulation is adopted-the firm would have no noninformational
incentive to expend resources on lobbying, since an increase in the
firm's lobbying effort would have no effect on the agency's expected
benefit from finalizing as opposed to withdrawing the regulation. If
firms will not lobby at the lobbying stage, they cannot credibly
threaten to lobby at the initial stage. In short, assuming I is zero or
small enough so that the agency knows up front whether the firm is
low or high cost, finns and agencies will engage in no lobbying at all;
litigation then becomes the only mechanism by which to "sort" between low-cost and high-cost firms. If I is large, but the sanction is
noncontingent, then firms might lobby to communicate their cost
structure to the agency. Lobbying in this case is like burning dollarsalthough with the difference that informational lobbying, unlike informational dollar-burning, imposes costs on the agency and thus the
prospect of informational lobbying could deter the agency from issuing the regulation in the first place.
Third, it would be interesting to vary Johnston's model in larger
ways. The firm and the agency might be uncertain, either symmetrically or asymmetrically, about other model parameters and variables
beside compliance cost-for example, about the size of the benefit
(B) produced by the regulation, or about the amount of lobbying that
the parties engage in. The political principals could have their own
preferences; rather than mechanistically imposing a sanction whose
magnitude depends solely on the amount of firm and agency lobbying, political principals might be seen either to be pro-regulatory
"Democrats" who aim (like the agency) at maximizing gross benefits
or more measured "Republicans" who aim at maximizing net benefits,
subject to the political constraint that they respond in some way to
firm or agency lobbying. 40 The model might be amended to give the
Con0ress). The issue merits more analysis.
See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensions of Regulatoiy Reform,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 52-91 (1994) (surveying positive political theory scholarship with
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where G(c,) = [1 - r(La(c,), Lf(c,))]c, + Lf(c,) gives the firm's optimal expected litigation cost (expenditure plus expected compliance cost)
given its known actual compliance cost and e the pooling level of lobbying effort. Now if there exists an e such that inequality (5) holds,
then the high-compliance-cost firm must also be better off in the pooling equilibrium than were it to separate and reveal its type (for this
reason, the pooling equilibrium is stable in the sense of the Perfect
Sequential Equilibrium stability notion).2 The reason is that by construction, the hypothesized equilibrium induces the agency to drop
the regulation, which is the best outcome. Now observe that both
types of firm are better off in any such pooling equilibrium, the lower
is the level of lobbying effort that they each choose, e, the lobbying
expenditure is bounded from below only by the constraint that the political sanction it generates, D(e), be sufficiently high to cause the
agency to drop the regulation when it does not learn that compliance
cost is low. Hence we have established the following:
Proposition 3. Whenever the agency will drop the regulation if lobbying
fails to identify the firm's actualcompliance cost, the unique BPE involves both
types of firms making the minimal lobbying expenditure necessary to generate a
politicalsanction that will induce the agency to drop the regulation.
Proof. The countersituation obtains when the agency will finalize
the regulation if it fails to learn firm type through the lobbying expenditures. In this event, the high-compliance-cost firm-which generates a lower expected payout to the agency from the post-regulation
litigation game-has an incentive to reveal its type to induce the
agency to drop the regulation. Such a high-cost firm is better off with
such a separating strategy for any lobbying expenditure ef with the
property that:
e < e (G(c,)) + G(ck),

(6)

But for the low-cost firm to be better off allowing its type to be revealed, it must be that
e > ef (G(c,)) + G(c,).

2 A concept due to Sanford Grossman
& Motty Perry, Perfect SequentialEquilibrium,
39J. ECON. THEORY97 (1986).
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firm will challenge when the agency finalizes (c is large)). In this case,
the equilibrium lobbying effort levels are given by:
eo" = argmax ([1- r(L:, L )][B - D(e., e)] - e. - L,*}, and
e = argmin [I - r(L,*(D(e, ef)), L ]c. + e + Lf ,
where I have written the firm's objective function to clarify that the
firm chooses its lobbying effort level knowing that through D(e,, e'), its
lobbying effort influences the agency's optimal litigation expenditure
in the next stage of the game, and where L and L.* respectively. solve
1
problems (3) and (4) above, and where e' denotes the effort level
chosen by a firm with compliance cost i, for i = , h.
The agency comes to the lobbying stage with incomplete information as to firm cost and hence as to whether or not the firm will challenge or comply if the regulation is finalized. The agency's type-the
maximum penalty D consistent with finalization-is common knowledge. If the agency knows that the firm will not challenge the regulation, then whenever B - D > 0, the agency will proceed to promulgate
or finalize the regulation. Thus even a low cost of compliance firm
may have an incentive to pool with the high cost of compliance firm in
choosing a lobbying effort e that conceals its type, if such concealment
forestalls the agency from finalizing the regulation.
To outline when such a pooling equilibrium might obtain, observe
that from the previous Section, we know that if r,2 > 0 (so that firm
litigation expenditure reduces the marginal effectiveness of agency
litigation expenditure) then there must exist some value of expected
firm compliance cost such that the agency will concede the litigation
for any level of expected compliance cost above this level, and, anticipating this, drop the regulation at the lobbying stage. A lowcompliance-cost firm will be better off with such a mimicking strategy
whenever:

I The possibility of comer solutions at the final, legal challenge stage makes lobbying important as a way to convey, or conceal, information. Pooling incentives at the
lobbying stage may arise even when there is an interior solution to the final stage. Be8
cause the fact that Lf/c > 0 is common knowledge, when aLa / aLf > (<) 0, it is possicompliance-cost firm will have an incentive to mimic the low
(low-)
higha
ble that
(high) lobbying expenditures of a low- (high-) compliance-cost type to trick the agency
into making suboptimally low litigation effort at the final, legal challenge stage. Without any particular assumption on sign L, / aL? I focus on incentives in the corner solution case.
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By monotonicity, it must be that G(c) > G(c,) and e(G(c)) > e/G(c,)).
This establishes the following:
Corollary. If the agency will drop the regulation if it learns that
the firm is a high-compliance-cost type, then the unique BPE involves
a separating lobbying expenditure of ef (G(c,)) + G(c,) + E by the highcost firm and ef(G(c)) + G(c,) by the low-cost firm.
In other words, the regulation-deterring lobbying expenditure
by the high-compliance-cost firm is equal to the expected total cost,
including lobbying expenditure, to the low-cost firm that will be regulated in equilibrium. As a rough guide, the total cost of regulation is
equal to the number of proposed regulations (whether or not finalized) multiplied by the total cost of finalized regulations to covered
firms.
The agency's lobbying expenditure does not reveal information,
for under my assumptions the agency does not have any information
to reveal. Rather, since aD/ce < 0 and LD/ae > 0, if the agency does
not make a sufficiently large expenditure on lobbying, then it may incur such a large political sanction that finalization of the regulation,
given expected legal challenge, is not credible. By increasing its own
expenditure, the agency makes the pooling equilibrium much more
costly, and should at least be able to deter the low-cost firm from pursuing this. The agency is better off because it gets information and
then uses it to cut its costs of wasted regulation.
C. StrategicIncentivesfor Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis
Under a Benefits Statute
Now suppose that at cost I > 0, the agency can gain perfect information as to the firm's actual compliance cost. There are several possible ways that the agency can benefit from acquiring such information:
1. In the final, legal challenge stage, the firm's optimal litigation
expenditure is given by Lf (c, L), so learning c allows the agency to
make a full-information, expected-payoff-maximizing litigation expenditure in this final stage. The magnitude of the agency's benefit
from learning c depends upon the sensitivity of the firm's optimal litigation effort to the firm's compliance cost. By the argument made
earlier, it is quite likely that the function oL," / aL; will take an Sshaped form, with both a convex and a concave portion. Since Lf*is
monotonically increasing in c, it is possible that by spending I > 0 and
learning the actual magnitude of the firm's compliance costs, the
agency's expected litigation expenditure will fall. This occurs when

1422

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYL VANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150:1343

the possible realizations of the firm's cost are high enough to put the
agency in the concave portion of its response function. Rather than
spending the certain amount L:'(L.)^-the expenditure that is optimal given the firm's expected expenditure L -- PL; + PhL '-the
agency spends either L(Lf(c)), or Lj(Lf(c)), and by concavity its expected expenditure falls. Hence the litigation stage benefit to the
agency from learning the firm's compliance cost depends on the
magnitude of the compliance cost: the higher the possible realizations of firm compliance cost, the more likely it is that the agency will
actually realize a net cost savings by spending I to learn the firm's
compliance cost.
2. The preceding implicitly assumes that the agency will defend
the regulation if challenged even if it does not know the firm's compliance cost. By learning the firm's compliance cost before the lobbying stage of the game, the agency effectively eliminates the informational value of lobbying expenditures. That is, the firm's incentive to
use lobbying expenditure as a way respectively to conceal (if low) or
reveal (if high) its compliance-cost type vanishes when the agency already has this information. The only function of lobbying expenditures is to increase the cost D to the agency of finalizing the regulation. The benefit to the firm from so doing is likely to exhibit a
discontinuity. For each compliance-cost type, i = 1, h, there is a regulatory penalty D', such that the agency will drop the regulation for any
D > D'i with D ^h < D'. Below this threshold, increases in the agency's
political penalty D indirectly benefit the firm because reductions in
the agency's net benefit from regulating reduce its optimal litigation
expenditure, reducing the firm's expected litigation stage cost (litigation cost plus expected compliance cost). Because, however, the
agency knows the firm's actual compliance cost, the low-cost firm's
level of regulation-killing lobbying expenditure increases, while the
high-cost firm's level falls. The low-cost firm can no longer free-ride
off the expected high litigation expenditures of the high-cost firm.
Conversely, the high-cost firm is no longer effectively subsidizing the
low-cost firm.
To be more precise, when the agency would drop the regulation
in the absence of precise knowledge of the firm's compliance cost, it
must drop the regulation when it learns that the firm is high cost. In
this case, the agency drops the regulation as soon as it learns that the
firm is high cost and lobbying never occurs. The low-cost firm is left
to lobby on its own and is strictly worse off than it was under agency
ignorance. A direct implication is that in industries where there are
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both high- and low-compliance-cost firms, the low-compliance-cost
firms have an incentive to prevent the agency from acquiring verifiable information as to firm cost, even if this means obstructing disclosure of costs by high-cost firms.
If the agency would drop the regulation only if it learns that the
firm has high compliance cost, then the high-compliance-cost firm
again benefits greatly by agency information acquisition. It does not
need to lobby at all to deter regulation. In the separating equilibrium,
the low-cost firm cannot kill regulation in any event, and so that firm
already was choosing its lobbying expenditures solely for its indirect
benefit in weakening the agency's effort level at the judicial review
stage. In this case agency information acquisition leaves the low-cost
firm's payoff unchanged.
D. The Regulation Game Under a Substantive Cost-Benefit Statute
Under a substantive cost-benefit statute, the probability that the
regulation is vacated by the court on judicial review is given by r (L.,
Lf, B/c) with r, < O, r,, > 0, r2 > 0, r22 < 0, r, < 0, r, > 0, r,, < 0, and r2, < 0.
That is, under a substantive cost-benefit statute, as the probability of
judicial reversal falls, the higher is the ratio of actual regulatory benefits to regulatory costs. Moreover, my assumptions about the cross
partials mean that the higher is the ratio of benefits to costs, the bigger (smaller) is the marginal productivity of agency (firm) litigation
effort. Now in general courts are imperfect verifiers of both costs and
benefits, and so it is reasonable for this general case to believe that r(
is continuous. When the court perfectly and costlessly observes both
costs and benefits, however, r0 is a simple step function, with r = 0 for
c < B and r = 1 for c > B. This case provides a benchmark for further
analysis, and I begin with a significant fact about behavior under such
a regime.
1.

Perfect and Costless Judicial Review

The first thing to notice is that the high cost of compliance, c, type
firm will win with probability one at the final judicial review stage, and
when this stage is costless, there is no reason for such a firm to spend
anything on lobbying. Conversely, the low cost of compliance firm always loses on judicial review. Hence if that stage is ever reached, its
costs are given by c. For this reason, at the prior, lobbying stage, the
agency's problem becomes:
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where we recall that A is the agency's prior probability that the firm
has low compliance cost (and will thus actually be regulated). Under
my maintained assumption that the regulation cannot be modified in
response to lobbying, the only reason for the low-cost firm to spend
any positive amount on lobbying is if the lobbying process is so responsive to the firm's efforts that the firm can drive B - D to 0. The
firm chooses this regulation-killing lobbying strategy if and only if the
regulation-killing lobbying level (which we will denote by e ) is such
that e' < c, (that is, it is cheaper for the firm to lobby and kill the regulation than to comply). If, conversely, the firm cannot drive the net
regulatory benefit to 0 via lobbying, it will spend nothing on lobbying
and from (7), the agency's payoff is given by pB. In this case, since
judicial review is a costless way for the agency to screen regulatory targets by their compliance costs, there is no reason for the agency to
undertake any positive investment I to do such screening before it
promulgates the regulation. This establishes the following:
Proposition 4. Underperfect and costlessjudicialreview of a substantive
cost-benefit statute, the agency proceeds with regulation whenever there is any
positive probability that the regulation is cost-benefitjustified, unlessfirm lobbying is so cheap and effective that a low-compliance-costfirm is better off lobbying
to kill the regulationthan it would be by complying.
2.

Costly and Imperfect Judicial Review

Under costly and imperfect judicial review, the r) function takes
the more general form specified at the beginning of this Section. Observe that B/c e [0, -c]. For comparative purposes, I take the function
r(L, L. B/B)-the reversal probability under a benefits statute-as
equal to r(L,, L? B/c) for all values of B such that B/c <B/B, where, as
defined above, B is the judicially defined level of "significant" or
"substantial" benefits required by a benefits statute. To avoid generating results on benefits versus cost-benefits statutes that are merely a
tautological consequence of this assumption, I presume that B/c >
B/B but consider both B/cA <B/B and B/c, > B/B.
The most important consequence of costly and imperfect judicial
review of a substantive cost-benefit statute is that both types of firm are
at risk in the final, judicial review stage. By my assumptions on r, and
r2, the low-compliance-cost firm is more at risk but also sees the marginal productivity of its litigation efforts fall (that is, when B/c increases, the r(L) function shifts down and its slope decreases). Since
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the stakes are the firm's compliance costs, we can unambiguously say
that the low compliance cost firm will always have a lower optimal litigation effort than the high-compliance-cost firm. It is not possible,
however, to say which type of firm will have higher total expected costs
at the litigation stage. In general, the more accurate is the process of
judicial review-in the precise sense that irJ[ is large-the more likely
it is that the high-compliance-cost firm will have lower expected equilibrium costs at the judicial review stage than will the low compliance
cost firm, and the more likely that the low compliance cost firm will
simply comply rather than seek judicial review.
Because the impact of the actual benefit/cost ratio on the firm's
expected total cost at the judicial review stage is ambiguous, so too are
the relative lobbying efforts that low versus high-compliance-cost-type
firms make in anticipation of the judicial review stage. The one clear
result is that unlike the perfect and costless cost-benefit judicial review-where only the low-cost firm has an incentive to lobby-in the
general case of costly and imperfect judicial review of a substantive
cost-benefit statute, both types of firms will in general have an incentive to lobby. Whether lobbying is informative depends upon precisely
the same variables considered above in analyzing the benefits statute.
It is possible to compare results under a cost-benefit statute with
those under a benefits statute only if we make specific assumptions
about how the magnitude of gross benefits affects judicial review under a benefits statute and how the magnitude of net benefits affects
judicial review under a cost-benefit statute. I consider only one case:
where the substantive standard B that courts use in considering gross
benefits under the benefits statute is also the same substantive standard employed in considering net benefits under a cost-benefits statute.3 The interesting cases arise when B/c < B but B > B. This is most
likely to arise, of course, when c is high, so I consider the situation in
my two type model where B/c, > B, and B > B, but B/ 4 < B. Given the
assumptions on the judicial review function, r 0, that I have made
above, the move from a benefits statute to a cost benefits statute has,
ceteris paribus, increased the expected total cost at the judicial review
stage for the low-compliance-cost firm and decreased it for the highcompliance-cost firm. Hence, optimal lobbying expenditures increase
for the low-compliance-cost firm and fall for the high-compliance-cost

3 It may be more customary to think of the cost-benefit
standard not as some value
B > 1, but simply as requiring B / c - I, which implies B = 1. The results obtained
here carry over directly to this special case.
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firm. In fact, the firms may now effectively reverse type at the lobbying
stage: the cost-benefit statute may make the expected total costs at the
judicial review stage higher for the low-compliance-cost firm than for
the high-compliance-cost firm, so that the low-compliance-cost firm
lobbies more than does the high-compliance-cost firm. Short of such
a reversal, by referring back to inequality (5), we can see that if there
exists a level of type-concealing lobbying expenditure that causes the
agency to withdraw the regulation (by reducing its expected benefit to
0), then moving from a benefits to cost-benefit statute has increased
the low-compliance-cost firm's incentive to make such a typeconcealing lobbying effort. Hence if the cost-benefit regime cannot
be accurately reviewed by courts, then it may simply increase the incentive for uninformative, regulation-killing lobbying by low-compliance-cost targets.
E. The Regulation Game Under ProceduralCost-Benefit Statutes
Under a procedural cost-benefits statute, the reversal probability is
given by r(L,, L, I) with r3 < 0, r, > 0, r,, < 0, and r2, < 0. That is, by
spending a positive amount I to learn the firm's compliance cost before officially promulgating the regulation, the agency increases the
marginal productivity of its litigation effort at the judicial review stage
and reduces the marginal productivity of the firm's litigation effort at
that stage.
1. Perfect Ex PostJudicial Verification of Ex Ante Agency Balancing
In this first, benchmark case, the court can costlessly and perfectly
verify in ex post judicial review whether or not the agency has invested
the time and effort ex ante to learn about compliance cost and balance compliance cost against its perceived benefit. If I> 0, then the
agency wins on judicial review with probability 1 (that is, r = 0); if I =
0, then the agency certainly loses at that stage (r = 1). It provides a
benchmark to then consider the effect of increasingly imperfect and
costly ex post verification of ex ante agency balancing.
It is immediate that the agency will never regulate if it does not invest in learning firm type (I = 0) since both types of firm are sure to
win on judicial review and the agency is sure to lose. When I > 0, the
agency is sure to win and the firm, regardless of its type, is sure to lose.
These certain outcomes at the judicial review stage create a sharp discontiniuity in incentives at the lobbying stage, as summarized in the
following:
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Proposition 5. (1) Under a perfect and costless procedural cost-benefit
statute, when I > B, the agency does not regulate. Wen I < B, the agency regulates whenever it is cheaperfor the firm to comply than to kill the regulation
through lobbying; and, (2) the perfect procedural cost-benefit statute maximizes
the productivity of agency lobbying and minimizes the productivity of firm lobbying.
Proof. Let e and e1 denote the optimal lobbying effort by the
high- and low-cost type firm, and ea* the optimal lobbying effort by the
agency. For the firm and agency, we have that:
e = Oif B -D(e, e. )> 0, and
ej= e B-D(ej, e,
0 ande<c,
ef = mn
e e;
ea* = min
eo le.

3 [B -D(el,

where

ea*) < 0]]

[B- D(e, e.)- I > 0]], and

e;= Pe+ P,e;

(8)

Because I have assumed that the regulation cannot be modified in
response to firm lobbying, if the firm cannot kill the regulationgiven the agency's optimal lobbying effort e-then there is no reason
for the firm to spend any amount lobbying, and so the firm simply complies whenever the agency regulates. Even when it can kill the regulation, the firm complies when the agency regulates if complying is
cheaper than killing the regulation. The agency regulates only if it expects a net positive return from regulating given optimal firm behavior and given also the cost I of the ex ante balancing it needs to do to
ensure success at the judicial review stage.
To see the second part of the proposition, recall that given that it
has proposed the regulation and that lobbying cannot kill the regulation (the corner solution is ruled out) the agency chooses its lobbying
effort under a benefits statute to solve:
max
e. (1 - r(L,, L1 ))(B- D(e%, e),

(9)

Since 0 < r < 1, the interior solution to (9), e is at its maximum
when r = 0. That is, certain success at the judicial review stage maximizes the agency's incentive to lobby. The procedural cost-benefit
statute thus maximizes the agency's incentive to lobby for regulation
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(relative to a benefits statute).
To see the comparison for the firm, let the regulation killing corner solution eW for a firm under the benefits statute be defined by:
min [e; D [(1 - r(L(D(e., e;), L) (B -D(e., e;)] = 01,

e;

(10)

Expression (10) has been written to make explicit the fact that by
influencing D(e,, e), the firm's lobbying effort indirectly benefits the
firm by lowering the agency's optimal litigation effort (with aLa / aD <
0 and aD / aef, we have 8La / aef < 0). Under the perfect and costless
procedural cost-benefits statute, by contrast, L. = Lf = r = 0. The solu-

tion must be higher-more costly-under a procedural cost-benefit
statute than under a benefits statute.
2.

Costly and Imperfect Ex PostJudicial Verification
of Ex Ante Agency Process

In the more general case, by investing I > 0 the agency does not
guarantee success at the judicial review stage, but increases the
chances that the regulation will be upheld and also increases the marginal productivity of agency litigation effort at that stage. The first
best result occurs when the agency invests I but regulates if and only if
the firm's compliance cost is low. The problem with a purely procedural cost-benefit statute is that the firm's compliance cost ci is not legally relevant to whether the agency action is upheld. Whether the
agency made the investment I in learning compliance cost is relevant
under this statutory regime, but there are conflicting effects: the bigger in absolute value are the cross partials r, and r2, and the partial r,
given above, the bigger is the incentive for the agency to invest I, but
also the greater its incentive to regulate no matter what the firm's
compliance cost. Hence the only general result is the following:
Proposition 6. The socially optimal procedural cost-benefit regime is the
one that attaches the most weight to agency process while still being sufficiently
sensitive to litigation effort at the judicialreview stage that the agency will not
regulate if it learns that compliance cost is high.

